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The Justiciability of Cancelled Patents
Greg Reilly*
Abstract
The recent expansion of the Patent Office’s power to
invalidate issued patents raises a coordination problem when
there is concurrent litigation, particularly where the federal
courts have already upheld the patent’s validity. The Federal
Circuit has concluded that Patent Office cancellation
extinguishes litigation pending at any stage and requires
vacating prior decisions in the case. This rule is widely criticized
on doctrinal, policy, and separation of powers grounds. Yet the
Federal Circuit has reached (almost) the right outcome, except
for the wrong reasons. Both the Federal Circuit and its critics
overlook that the Federal Circuit’s rule reflects a straightforward
application of the justiciability limits on the power of the federal
courts. Patent cancellation eliminates the exclusive rights that
form the basis for the plaintiff’s suit, mooting the infringement
case no matter how belated in the litigation. Courts typically
vacate prior judgments and decisions when a pending case
becomes moot, exactly as the Federal Circuit requires. Properly
rooting the effects of Patent Office cancellation in mootness
addresses critics’ doctrinal and policy concerns. It also
demonstrates that critics’ separation of powers concerns are
exactly backwards. The Federal Circuit’s rule is not a threat to
the constitutional structure or the role of federal courts but rather
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a necessary result of Article III’s limits on federal judicial power.
Courts and Congress each have potential ways to mitigate policy
concerns from allowing Patent Office cancellation to trump
litigation, while respecting mootness, but these ways introduce
their own problems. Courts may have some discretion to decline
to vacate prior judgments but doing so would have limited
impact and could be an unwarranted departure from generally
applicable procedural rules. Congress could limit the retroactive
effect of patent cancellation, but this would be historically novel
and raise its own policy concerns.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that a plaintiff files a case in federal court alleging
infringement of the exclusive rights granted by a patent duly
issued by the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“Patent Office”). Three years later, a jury returns a verdict for
the plaintiff finding infringement, upholding the validity of the
patent, and awarding damages. Three years after that, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which
has nationwide appellate jurisdiction in patent cases,1 affirms
the infringement and validity findings and remands to the
district court only on a few remedial issues. Those issues are
resolved on remand and another appeal is taken to the Federal
Circuit. In the interim, the Patent Office found the patent claims
at issue in the litigation invalid, the Federal Circuit affirmed
that finding, and the Patent Office cancelled the relevant patent
claims. Does the Patent Office’s cancellation of the patent claims
at issue—ten years into the litigation after a jury verdict in favor
of the patent owner and Federal Circuit affirmance on
liability— require dismissing the litigation and vacating the
prior decisions in the case on infringement, validity, and
damages?2
This question has been described as “critically important”
and “one of the most contentious issues in patent law today.”3
For nearly 200 years, this coordination question did not arise
because the federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction to
determine the validity of an issued patent, i.e., whether it met
the statutory criteria of patentability and was properly issued

1. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4).
2. The facts are drawn from Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter International,
Inc., 721 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
3. Paul R. Gugliuzza, (In)valid Patents, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271, 273,
293 (2016) [hereinafter Gugliuzza, (In)valid]; see Ben Picozzi, Comment,
Reimagining Finality in Parallel Patent Proceedings, 125 YALE L.J. 2519,
2533–34 (2016) (describing the coordination problem as “controversial”).
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by the Patent Office.4 But in the past forty years, and
particularly in the past decade, Congress has given the Patent
Office concurrent jurisdiction over invalidity.5 The question of
the effect of Patent Office cancellation on pending litigation
therefore arises more and more frequently.6 The Federal Circuit
has answered this question with a resounding yes—Patent
Office cancellation requires dismissing litigation pending at any
stage that involves the cancelled claims and vacating all prior
decisions and judgments in the case.7 A case only becomes
immune from the effects of Patent Office cancellation once it is
terminated by a litigation-ending judgment that is immediately
executable.8
The Federal Circuit’s conclusion has been lambasted by
judges, scholars, and other commentators as lacking sound
doctrinal support; raising efficiency, gamesmanship, and patent
policy concerns; and ignoring the constitutional structure and
separation of powers by allowing an executive agency to trump
decisions by federal courts.9 Twice in fewer than ten years, the
Federal Circuit has denied rehearing en banc on this question
over the vigorous dissents of nearly half the court.10 Although
the issue has received surprisingly little scholarly attention
despite its importance and contentiousness,11 the only major
4. See Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., 926 F.3d 1327, 1331–37
(Fed. Cir. 2019) (describing the development of Patent Office post-issuance
invalidity proceedings).
5. See Gugliuzza, (In)valid, supra note 3, at 280–83 (explaining that
Congress expanded the Patent Office’s jurisdiction by “creat[ing] several
post-issuance proceedings in addition to ex parte reexamination”).
6. Id. at 273.
7. See Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1341, 1347 (ordering that the district court
dismiss the case because the Patent Office issued a cancellation).
8. See WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 913 F.3d 1067,
1072 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“ION cannot now reopen the agreed and fully paid
unappealable final judgment on the reasonable royalty based on the
subsequent invalidation of a subset of asserted patent claims.”).
9. See infra Part II.C.
10. Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 733 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (denial of rehearing en banc) (four of ten judges dissenting from denial);
ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 790 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (denial of
rehearing en banc) (five of ten judges dissenting from denial).
11. See Gugliuzza, (In)valid, supra note 3, at 292 (noting that “to date,
few commentators have tried to answer that question” regarding the effect on
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scholarly analysis, by Professor Paul Gugliuzza, finds
“problematic” what he labels the Federal Circuit’s “absolute
finality rule.”12 Even Supreme Court Justice Gorsuch went out
of his way in dissent in an unrelated case to criticize what he
characterized as the Patent Office’s “power through inter partes
review to overrule final judicial judgments affirming patent
rights.”13
The Federal Circuit is right that Patent Office cancellation
trumps pending litigation. But its critics are right that the
Federal Circuit has failed to offer an adequate rationale for its
rule, unpersuasively mixing and misapplying various
procedural concepts like issue preclusion.14 What the Federal
Circuit and its critics both overlook, however, is that Patent
Office cancellation must trump pending litigation under
principles of mootness, a justiciability limit on the federal courts
deriving from Article III’s limit of federal judicial power to
“Cases” or “Controversies.”15 Mootness requires that the
plaintiff maintain “a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy throughout the pendency of the action.”16 Therefore,
if an intervening event causes the plaintiff to lose the right that
is being asserted in the federal court litigation, the case is
moot.17 A common intervening event that moots federal
litigation is the decision of another tribunal—whether another
federal court, a state court, or an administrative agency—that
conclusively resolves an issue necessary for the controversy in
the pending federal litigation.18 Because mootness limits the
jurisdiction of federal courts, a pending case that becomes moot
pending litigation of cancellation); Picozzi, supra note 3, at 2519 (“[T]he rule
[that cancellation trumps litigation] has attracted little academic
attention . . . .”).
12. See Gugliuzza, (In)valid, supra note 3, at 274.
13. Thryv, Inc. v. Click-to-Call Techs., LP, 140 S. Ct. 1367, 1388 (2020)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
14. See infra Part II.
15. See U.S. CONST. art. III (placing jurisdictional limits on federal
judicial power); Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 92 (2009) (explaining Article
III’s jurisdictional limits).
16. 15 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 101.93[2]
(3d ed. 2018) [hereinafter 15 MOORE’S].
17. See id.
18. See id. § 101.96.
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must be dismissed regardless of the stage of the litigation or
what work has already been done.19 And typically when an
intervening event moots federal litigation, prior judgments and
decisions on the merits are vacated.20
Mootness provides the missing rationale for the Federal
Circuit’s seemingly shaky rule that Patent Office cancellation
trumps pending infringement litigation. By statute, the
invalidity determination of the Patent Office’s Patent Trial and
Appeals Board (PTAB) is made conclusive once all appeals have
been resolved (or the time for appeal has passed), and the
Director of the Patent Office is required to issue a certificate
cancelling all invalidated claims.21 Cancellation extinguishes
the patent owner’s exclusive rights in the invention, the rights
being asserted in infringement litigation.22 Without the
exclusive rights granted by the patent, the patent owner no
longer has a personal stake in preventing the accused infringer
from using the invention.23 The intervening PTAB cancellation
thus moots any pending federal court infringement litigation, no
matter how advanced a stage, and warrants vacating prior
judgments and decisions on the merits.24
The Federal Circuit’s critics have it exactly backwards in
raising separation of powers concerns. The PTAB is not
reviewing, overruling, or displacing a decision of the federal
courts or otherwise encroaching on their power.25 Rather,
Congress gave the PTAB concurrent jurisdiction to conduct an
independent reconsideration of its prior patent grant and
expressly granted the Patent Office the power to cancel patent
rights that the PTAB found invalid.26 To proceed with litigation
of cancelled patent rights would ignore the limited jurisdiction
19. Id. § 101.92.
20. See Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 712 (2011) (explaining the
practice of “vacat[ing] the judgment below” when a suit becomes moot pending
appeal).
21. See 35 U.S.C. § 307(b) (ex parte reexamination); id. § 318(c) (inter
partes review); id. § 328(c) (post-grant review).
22. See infra Part III.A.1.
23. See infra Part III.A.1.
24. See infra Part III.A.2.
25. See infra Part III.C.
26. See infra Parts I.B, III.C.
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that Article III confers on the federal courts and cause federal
courts to encroach on both Congress’s power to design the patent
system27 and the executive’s power (granted by Congress) to
cancel wrongfully issued patent rights.28 The justiciability limits
of Article III, including mootness, are specifically meant to
“assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas
committed to the other branches of government.”29 To ignore the
effect of Patent Office cancellation—as critics propose to varying
degrees—would be to ignore the structural limits the
Constitution places on the federal courts to promote the proper
separation of powers.30
Mootness also addresses critics’ concerns about inefficiency,
gamesmanship, and patent incentives. As a mandatory
jurisdictional limit on federal courts’ power, mootness is not
subject to general discretionary, public policy, or fundamental
fairness exceptions.31 Concerns about inefficiency or the policy
objectives of a single subject matter, like patent law, must yield
to the structural and separation of powers concerns embodied in
mootness and the other Article III justiciability limits.32 As a
leading treatise has explained in a related context, “[t]his harsh
rule would be indefensible if what was involved was a simple
question of procedural regulation of practice. It can be justified
only because the issue concerns the fundamental constitutional
question” of the allocation of power within the constitutional
structure.33 At the same time, properly rooting the Federal
Circuit’s rule in mootness does impose some limits compared to
the Federal Circuit’s current approach.34 Under a proper

27. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power to issue
patents to “promote the progress of science and useful arts”).
28. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (authorizing the Patent Office to entertain
requests to cancel previously improperly issued patents).
29. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
30. See infra Part III.C.
31. See 15 MOORE’S, supra note 16, § 101.90 (explaining that there is no
manifest injustice or public interest exception to the Article III mootness
doctrine).
32. See infra Part III.C.
33. 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 3522 (3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter FPP].
34. See infra Part III.A.
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mootness analysis, the event that terminates litigation is the
Patent Office’s certificate of cancellation, not the earlier PTAB
invalidity decision (as would be true under issue preclusion) or
the Federal Circuit’s affirmance of that decision (as is true
under the Federal Circuit’s current doctrine).35 And mootness
only justifies terminating litigation as to patent claims actually
cancelled by the Patent Office, not similar but uncancelled
claims (as is true under the Federal Circuit’s approach).36
Further, the efficiency and patent policy concerns from
allowing Patent Office cancellation to trump pending federal
court litigation can be mitigated somewhat without running
afoul of the justiciability limits of Article III. Most obviously,
federal courts can, and frequently do, stay litigation to avoid
duplication and wasted resources if the PTAB subsequently
invalidates the patent.37 For a variety of reasons, though, stays
will not always be feasible.38
When litigation does occur simultaneously with PTAB
proceedings, a narrow path in mootness doctrine may allow
some prior judicial decisions in pending cases to stand despite
Patent Office cancellation. Some Supreme Court cases suggest
that whether to vacate prior decisions in a moot case is an
equitable determination based on what under the circumstances
would best reflect a just result and the public interest.39 On this
view, the concerns about efficiency, gamesmanship, and patent
policy might warrant merely dismissing the case without
vacating prior judicial decisions on infringement, invalidity, and
damages.40 However, because federal courts can take no action
on the merits upon a finding of mootness, the only cases in which
dismissing without vacating would make a difference are those
in which infringement, invalidity, and past damages have been
conclusively resolved (including via appeal) and the case

35. See infra Part III.A.
36. See infra Part III.A.
37. See infra Part III.A.
38. See infra Part I.C.
39. See U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 24–26
(1994) (modeling how to evaluate the equities when denying a motion for
vacatur in a moot case).
40. See infra Part IV.A.
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remains pending only on prospective relief or other matters.41
Moreover, declining to vacate in these circumstances could be
the type of patent-exceptional approach to general procedural
issues for which the Federal Circuit has been repeatedly
criticized by the Supreme Court,42 as vacatur is the typical
remedy unless mootness results from settlement or the
unilateral actions of the appellant.43
Ultimately, the problem of overlapping PTAB and judicial
invalidity determinations results from Congress’s grant of
concurrent invalidity jurisdiction, and the solution therefore
properly lies with Congress. Congress could eliminate the
validity jurisdiction of the courts or PTAB, but neither is
likely.44 Alternatively, Congress could eliminate or limit the
retroactive application of Patent Office cancellation to past
damages claims for pre-cancellation infringement.45 Black letter
mootness doctrine provides that viable claims for past damages
are not mooted even when an intervening event eliminates the
basis for the plaintiff’s suit.46 The only reason this rule does not
save pending infringement litigation from mootness is that
Congress has endorsed the Federal Circuit’s interpretation that
Patent Office cancellation extinguishes even past damages
claims because the patent is “void ab initio.”47 By altering the
statutory provisions to exempt some past damages claims for
pre-cancellation infringement—say those that have been
litigated to some sort of resolution (e.g., final district court
judgment or affirmance by the Federal Circuit) in the federal
courts before cancellation—Congress could mitigate the

41. See infra Part IV.A.
42. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1791, 1817–18 (2013) [hereinafter Gugliuzza, Federal Circuit]
(explaining that the Supreme Court rejects the idea “that general legal
principles, such as jurisdictional standards, do not apply in patent cases
because patent law is different” (internal quotations omitted)).
43. See FPP, supra note 33, §§ 3533.10–3533.10.1 (summarizing the basic
vacatur rule and its exceptions).
44. See infra Part IV.B.
45. See infra Part IV.B.
46. See infra Part I.B.2.
47. Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1340, 1346
(Fed. Cir. 2013).
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concerns of inefficiency, gamesmanship, and patent policy while
respecting the justiciability limits of the federal courts.
However, doing so is probably unadvisable because it would be
historically novel and raise countervailing policy concerns.48
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an
overview of the concurrent validity jurisdiction of the federal
courts and PTAB. Part II describes the basics, rationale,
criticism, and shortcomings of the Federal Circuit’s rule that
Patent Office cancellation trumps pending litigation and
judicial decisions. Part III explains how the Federal Circuit’s
rule reflects general principles of mootness and how mootness
addresses the concerns raised by allowing Patent Office
cancellation to trump federal court litigation. Part IV explores
potential ways to mitigate policy concerns raised by critics while
remaining faithful to Article III judicial limits.
I.

CONCURRENT INVALIDITY JURISDICTION IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND PATENT OFFICE

To obtain exclusive rights in an invention, the inventor
must file a patent application with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (Patent Office).49 A patent application
normally includes several claims, which describe the invention
at different levels of generality, describe the invention in various
ways, or describe various aspects of the invention.50 These
claims define the exclusive rights granted by the government to
the patent owner.51 Each claim is treated as a separate
invention and its patentability must be evaluated independently
of the other claims.52
48. See infra Part IV.B.
49. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. 261, 266 (2016) (“An
inventor obtains a patent by applying to the Patent Office.”); 35 U.S.C. § 111
(detailing how to obtain a patent).
50. See F. SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 91 (5th ed. 2011).
51. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(en banc) (“It is a bedrock principle of patent law that the claims of a patent
define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.”
(internal citations omitted)).
52. See Altoona Publix Theaters, Inc. v. Am. Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S.
477, 487 (1935).
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The applicant must satisfy several statutory criteria of
patentability to obtain patent protection. The claimed invention
must be the type of technological advancement for which patent
protection is granted (patent eligible subject matter) and must
have a real-world, practical function (utility) under Section 101
of the Patent Act; must be an actual invention that did not
previously exist under Section 102 (novelty or anticipation); and
must be sufficiently different from what did exist to warrant
patent protection under Section 103 (obviousness).53 Pursuant
to Section 112 of the Patent Act, the patent application also
must adequately teach a skilled person in the field how to make
and use the invention (enablement), must demonstrate that the
inventor actually possessed the invention (written description),
and must claim the invention with adequate precision
(definiteness).54
Patent examination is an ex parte proceeding between the
applicant and a patent examiner with expertise in the relevant
field.55 The applicant can appeal the denial of a patent
application.56 But if the examiner grants the application, the
patent issues without further review or opportunity for others
to challenge the grant.57 Patent examination has never been
conclusive in the American patent system.58 This Part describes
the concurrent invalidity jurisdiction now possessed by the
federal courts and the Patent Office, as well as tools for
managing duplicative proceedings in patent law and generally.

53. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103.
54. Id. § 112(a)–(b). A patent application must also disclose the best way
the inventor knows to implement the invention (best mode), but this is not a
basis for invalidity post-issuance. See id. (establishing the best mode
requirement); id. § 282(b)(3)(A) (removing the best mode requirement as “a
basis on which any claim of a patent may be canceled or held invalid or
otherwise unenforceable”).
55. See Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law:
Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 2014 (2013)
[hereinafter Wasserman, Changing Guard of Patent Law].
56. See Melissa F. Wasserman, The PTO’s Asymmetric Incentives:
Pressure to Expand Substantive Patent Law, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 379, 404 (2011).
57. See id. at 404–05.
58. See Megan M. LaBelle, Public Enforcement of Patent Law, 96 B.U. L.
REV. 1865, 1881, 1884 (2016) (summarizing the history of the patent
examination process).
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The Federal Courts’ Jurisdiction over Patent Invalidity

Since the earliest days of the American patent system,
issued patents have been subject to invalidity challenges as
affirmative defenses or counterclaims in federal court litigation
brought against those accused of violating, or infringing, the
patent’s exclusive rights. Of more recent origin (and less
commonly), accused infringers can raise invalidity challenges in
federal court by initiating declaratory judgment actions.59 A
patent claim is invalid if it fails any of the same statutory
criteria of patentability considered during patent examination.60
But an issued patent is presumed valid in litigation, with the
burden on the challenger to prove it invalid by clear and
convincing evidence.61
The Patent Act expressly makes invalidity an affirmative
defense to an infringement claim.62 Therefore, a successful
invalidity defense in litigation not only bars prospective relief
but also past damages for pre-invalidation infringement.63
However, a court’s invalidity finding does not technically
terminate the invalidated patent claim, as nothing in the Patent
Act provides for cancellation upon invalidation in litigation.64
The Patent Act merely provides an incentive for patent owners
to disclaim invalidated claims by barring recovery of litigation
costs in a subsequent infringement action for non-invalidated

59.
See id. at 1881, 1884–87 (describing the patent system’s evolution,
specifically concerning invalidity claims).
60. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2)–(3). The only exception is the best mode
requirement. Id. at (b)(3).
61. See id. § 282(a) (providing the validity presumption); Microsoft Corp.
v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011) (“[Section] 282 requires an invalidity
defense to be proved by clear and convincing evidence.”).
62. 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2)–(3).
63. See Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc. 575 U.S. 632, 644 (2015)
(“[I]f the patent is indeed invalid, and shown to be so under proper procedures
[as a defense in infringement litigation], there is no liability.”).
64. See Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(noting that federal court invalidation would affect reexamination based only
on issue preclusion, not because the invalidated claim is cancelled). But see
MPEP § 2286(II) (9th ed. rev. Oct. 2019) [hereinafter MPEP] (misstating the
holding of Ethicon v. Quigg as being that claims invalidated in litigation “no
longer exist in the patent”).
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claims in the same patent, if no disclaimer was filed with the
Patent Office.65
Because judicial invalidation does not cancel the patent
claims themselves, nothing in the Patent Act prevents a patent
owner from relitigating an invalidated patent claim.
Historically, patent owners did relitigate invalidated claims in
subsequent litigation against other accused infringers.66
However, motivated by general preclusion principles, cost
concerns, and opposition to giving patent holders multiple
chances at litigating validity, the Supreme Court in
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois
Foundation67 concluded that the general procedural concept of
issue preclusion bars a patent owner whose patent claim was
invalidated from subsequently litigating that claim against
other defendants.68
B.

The PTAB’s Jurisdiction over Patent Invalidity

For most of the patent system’s history, federal district
courts were the only place to challenge the validity of an issued
patent.69 As late as 1971, the Supreme Court explained that
“Congress has from the outset . . . lodg[ed] in the federal courts
final authority to decide that question” of patentability.70
However, the federal courts’ exclusive invalidity jurisdiction
became viewed as inadequate.71 Due to resource constraints,
incentives, and the ex parte nature of examination, many
commentators believe that “the PTO does a poor job of
examining patents, allowing significant numbers of invalid
65. See 35 U.S.C. § 288.
66. See Blonder-Tongue Lab’ys, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313,
321 (1971) (discussing the Court’s precedent about relitigating a patent claim’s
validity).
67. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
68. See id. at 350 (overruling a case that “foreclose[d] a plea of estoppel
by one facing a charge of infringement of a patent that has once been declared
invalid”); see also infra Part IV.D (discussing the basics of issue preclusion).
69. See LaBelle, supra note 58, at 1884 (“[A]lmost a century after the
[Patent Act of 1836] passed, Congress . . . began expanding the means for
challenging patents in federal court.”).
70. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 332.
71. See supra Part I.A.
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patents to issue.”72 The existence of these invalid patents
“impose[s] significant societal costs, including discouraging
competition, driving up the cost of innovation, and eroding
confidence in the patent system.”73
Invalidating a patent through federal court litigation is
expensive, time-consuming, and requires undertaking the risk
of infringement to obtain invalidation.74 Moreover, the
presumption of validity and resulting clear and convincing
evidence burden in litigation insulate even some bad patents
from invalidation.75 To address these concerns, Congress
repeatedly created new Patent Office post-issuance proceedings
over the past forty years “to improve the likelihood that invalid
patents would be quickly weeded out of the system.”76 Congress
sought to allow the Patent Office to reconsider the validity of
patents that concerned the public and offer a cheaper, faster,
and more expert means to invalidate bad patents.77
1.

The Development of PTAB Invalidity Jurisdiction

In 1980, Congress created ex parte reexamination, which
for the first time allowed issued patents to be challenged and
potentially cancelled in the Patent Office.78 Ex parte
reexamination allows the Patent Office to reconsider the novelty
or non-obviousness of a patent based only on printed prior art
(e.g., prior patents, publications, etc.) under a preponderance of

72. Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 477 (2011); see
also Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., 926 F.3d 1327, 1331–32 (Fed. Cir.
2019) (highlighting how “constrained resources and the absence of material
outside input during the initial examination” cause the PTO’s struggles to
attract and keep able patent examiners and its inevitable mistakes in patent
granting).
73. LaBelle, supra note 58, at 1880.
74. See LSI, 926 F.3d at 1333.
75. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for
Its Money: Challenging Patents in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 238
(2015).
76. Id. at 236.
77. See LSI, 926 F.3d at 1333–35 (stating that in 1980, Congress enacted
reexamination to enlist third-party help with patent invalidation); Dreyfuss,
supra note 75, at 239–40 (highlighting the new procedure’s benefits).
78. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. 261, 266–67 (2016).
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the evidence standard.79 Reexamination, which remains
available, is similar to initial patent examination, involving just
the patentee and the patent examiner.80 Partially for this
reason, reexamination was insufficient to achieve Congress’s
goals of eliminating bad patents quickly and cheaply.81
The America Invents Act of 2011 (AIA) substantially
overhauled and expanded Patent Office post-issuance
proceedings to address these shortcomings.82 First, it created
inter partes review, which allows any party to challenge an
issued patent for anticipation or non-obviousness based on
patents and printed publications from nine months after the
patent issues through the life of the patent.83 Second, the AIA
created post-grant review, which allows any party to challenge
a patent on any statutory criteria of patentability within nine
months of issuance.84 The new AIA proceedings are adversarial
proceedings involving both the patentee and requestor that
include limited discovery and an oral hearing.85 They are
resolved by three administrative patent judges of the
newly-created PTAB, rather than a patent examiner, using a
preponderance of the evidence standard.86
79. See MPEP § 2209 (basis for a reexamination); id. § 2280
(preponderance of the evidence standard).
80. Id.; see 35 U.S.C. § 307 (describing the reexamination proceeding).
From 1999–2012, Congress also provided inter partes reexamination that
allowed some participation by the requestor. See MPEP § 2609 (stating the
characteristics of inter partes reexamination); 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(b), 315(b)
(pre-AIA).
81. See LSI, 926 F.3d at 1335 (“Congress replaced inter partes
reexamination with new post-grant review procedures . . . designed to improve
on the inter partes reexamination process.”).
82. The AIA also created a temporary covered business method patent
review program that expired in 2020. Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 609, 636–37 (2012).
83. Id. at 633–35.
84. Id. at 631–32.
85. See Wasserman, Changing Guard of Patent Law, supra note 55, at
1981–83 (noting that PTAB proceedings include oral argument, discovery, and
other features of “adverse, trial-like adjudications”)); Tran, supra note 82, at
633–34, 636–37 (describing the procedures of PTAB proceedings).
86. Wasserman, Changing Guard of Patent Law, supra note 55, at 1983;
see Tran, supra note 82, at 633–34, 636–37 (describing the procedures of PTAB
proceedings).
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The AIA proceedings, particularly inter partes review, have
proven very popular and quite effective, with much higher
invalidation rates than either district court litigation or
reexamination.87 Probably for these very reasons, they have also
proven highly controversial. Some commentators contend that
“the PTAB has gone too far with its charge of eliminating bad
patents” and “is now invalidating patents in a willy-nilly
fashion.”88
2.

The Effect of PTAB Invalidation

Nearly identical provisions regarding each of the three
Patent Office post-issuance invalidity proceedings (collectively,
“PTAB proceedings”) provide in relevant part that “when the
time for appeal has expired or any appeal proceeding has
terminated, the Director [of the Patent Office] will issue and
publish a certificate canceling any claim of the patent finally
determined to be unpatentable.”89 Unlike litigation, where
invalidated claims still technically exist but are unenforceable
due to preclusion, PTAB invalidation officially extinguishes the
patent owner’s exclusive rights.90 The invalidated claim ceases
to exist, though not until after appeals to the Federal Circuit
and potentially the Supreme Court are resolved (or the time for
such appeals has run) and the Director undertakes the
ministerial task of issuing the cancellation certificate.91
The Federal Circuit has concluded that Patent Office
cancellation is not limited to prospective effect but also bars past
damages for pre-cancellation infringement because “cancelled
claims [a]re void ab initio.”92 This is consistent with the effect of
87. Dreyfuss, supra note 75, at 249–51.
88. Alden Abbott et al., Crippling the Innovation Economy: Regulatory
Overreach at the Patent Office 4 (Aug. 14, 2017) (unpublished manuscript),
https://perma.cc/6UH4-RJH9 (PDF).
89. 35 U.S.C. § 307(a); see id. § 307(b) (ex parte reexamination); id.
§ 318(c) (inter partes review); id. § 328(c) (post-grant review).
90. See Abbott et al., supra note 88, at 12.
91. See United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970, 1981 (2021)
(describing the Director’s “ministerial duty” to issue cancellation certificates
after PTAB invalidation and appellate review).
92. Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1340–41,
1346 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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invalidation in litigation, though its statutory basis is less clear
for PTAB invalidation than judicial invalidation.93 The Patent
Act does not expressly address the effect of Patent Office
cancellation on past damages claims, but the Federal Circuit
concluded that “Congress made section 252, which limits the
enforcement of reissued claims, applicable to reexamined
claims.”94 The court therefore concluded that the effect of Patent
Office cancellation was the same as the effect of reissuance, i.e.,
when a patent owner voluntarily seeks to correct an error in a
previously granted patent.95
The first paragraph of Section 252 sets a baseline of
prospective-only effect for reissued claims, providing that “every
reissued patent shall have the same effect and operation in law,
on the trial of actions for causes thereafter arising, as if the same
had been originally granted in such amended form.”96
Originally, reissuance only permitted claims for post-reissuance
infringement and extinguished all past damages claims based
on the original patent.97 In 1928, Congress created an exception
in Section 252’s first paragraph that “in so far as the claims of
the original and reissued patents are substantially identical,
such surrender shall not affect any action then pending nor
abate any cause of action then existing.”98 However, “the 1928
amendment did nothing to change the rule that suits based on
cancelled claims must be dismissed,” even for pre-reissuance
infringement, because “original claims that are not reissued in
identical form became unenforceable.”99
Although the statutory provisions for PTAB proceedings
lack Section 252’s language setting a prospective-only
baseline,100 the Federal Circuit concluded the reissuance rules
apply to Patent Office cancellation because the Patent Act
93. See supra Part I.A (addressing judicial invalidation).
94. Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1339–40.
95. Id.
96. 35 U.S.C. § 252 (emphasis added).
97. See Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1336 (providing the history and scope of
the PTO’s reissue authority).
98. 35 U.S.C. § 252 (emphasis added).
99. Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1338.
100. See 35 U.S.C. § 307(b) (reexamination); id. § 318(c) (inter partes
review); id. § 328(c) (post-grant review).
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provides that patents reviewed by the PTAB review “will have
the same effect as that specified in section 252.”101 However, the
quoted language is about “proposed amended or new claim[s],”
not cancelled claims, and further specifies that PTAB
proceedings will have the same effect as Section 252, not
generally, but specifically “on the right of any person” who
made, purchased, used, or imported (or made substantial
preparation to do so) the invention covered in the new or
amended claim before the issuance of the reexamination
certificate.102 This seems to specifically refer to the second
paragraph of Section 252, which creates so-called intervening
rights that allow someone engaged in activity that did not
infringe an original claim before reissuance to continue that
activity after reissuance even if it does infringe a claim in the
reissued patent.103 Intervening rights limit the availability of
future damages for post-reissuance infringement but do not
address past damages claims for pre-reissuance infringement.104
As a purely textual matter, therefore, the Federal Circuit’s
conclusion that Patent Office cancellation extinguishes past
damages claims for pre-cancellation infringement is
questionable.
However, this interpretation is long-standing. In 1987, the
Federal Circuit held that “the reexamination statute, section
307, incorporate[d] both paragraphs of section 252.”105 And in
1997, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed its conclusion that all of
Section 252 applied to reexamined patents and therefore
explicitly noted that “[u]nless a claim granted or confirmed upon
reexamination is identical to an original claim, the patent
101. Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1339 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 307(b)). The Federal
Circuit’s conclusion was specifically about the effect of ex parte reexamination
under Section 307(b) but is equally applicable to the nearly identical language
describing the effect of inter partes review and post-grant review. See 35
U.S.C. § 318(c) (inter partes review); id. § 328(c) (post-grant review).
102. 35 U.S.C. § 307(b).
103. The IPR and PGR provisions even title their relevant provisions
“Intervening Rights.” 35 U.S.C. § 318(c) (inter partes review); id. § 328(c)
(post-grant review).
104. See Fortel Corp. v. Phone-Mate, Inc., 825 F.2d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (finding “the doctrine of intervening rights is irrelevant” because no
infringement occurred after reexamination).
105. Id. at 1579–81.
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cannot be enforced against infringing activity that occurred
before issuance of the reexamination certificate.”106 Since these
decisions, Congress has significantly revised Patent Office
post-issuance proceedings, first in 1999107 and then more
significantly in the America Invents Act of 2011,108 without
altering the statutory language or the Federal Circuit’s
interpretation. Rather, Congress reaffirmed the relevant
statutory language by copying it virtually verbatim into the IPR
and PGR provisions related to the effect of PTAB invalidation.109
Statutory interpretation principles provide that Congress’s
acquiescence to a long-standing judicial interpretation by failing
to overrule it and, more significantly, reenacting the relevant
statutory provision, incorporates the judicial interpretation into
the statute itself.110 Although somewhat inconsistently followed,
the canons of acquiescence and reenactment are strongest when
there is evidence of “Congress’ awareness of the interpretative
issue, and some deliberation about it.”111 The record is sparse,
but Congress did address the issue during debate on the AIA.112
One senator commenting on the relevant provisions for inter
partes review and post-grant review explicitly endorsed the
Federal Circuit’s approach, noting “section 252, first paragraph”
was relevant to these provisions and “provide[d] that damages
accrue only from the date of the conclusion of review if claim
scope has been substantively altered in the proceeding.”113 Thus,
106. Bloom Eng’g Co. v. N. Am. Mfg. Co., 129 F.3d 1247, 1250 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
107. See Optional Inter Partes Reexamination Procedure Act of 1999, Pub.
L. No. 106-113, §§ 4601–4608, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999) (creating inter partes
reexamination) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 100, 301, 311–315).
108. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125
Stat. 284 (2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1, 6–8).
109. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 307(b) (reexamination), with id. § 318 (inter
partes review), and id. § 328 (post-grant review).
110. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87
MICH. L. REV. 67, 69 (1988).
111. Id. at 71.
112. See Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America
Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 FED. CIR. BAR J. 539, 540 (2012) (summarizing the
Senate debates).
113. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 157 Cong. Rec. S5,429 (daily ed. Sept.
8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl)).
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the rule that Patent Office cancellation bars even past damages
claims for pre-cancellation infringement rests on sound
foundations, despite textual ambiguity.
C.

Tools for Managing Concurrent Invalidity Jurisdiction

The federal courts and PTAB now have concurrent
jurisdiction to resolve patent invalidity, which can be, and often
is, invoked simultaneously.114 The Patent Act specifically
recognizes that infringement defendants will also initiate PTAB
proceedings, setting a time limit for them to do so.115 This
subpart describes existing tools in patent law and generally that
courts and the PTAB can use to avoid duplicative invalidity
proceedings.
1.

The Inevitability of Duplicative Invalidity Proceedings

The Patent Act includes several provisions for the new
PTAB proceedings that reduce, at least a little, the likelihood of
duplicative invalidity proceedings. First, the PTAB is barred
from instituting inter partes review or post grant review if the
petitioner first filed an invalidity declaratory judgment action
in federal court, and any such action subsequently filed is
automatically stayed.116 These provisions only apply in the less
common situation where the accused infringer initiates federal
litigation and expressly exclude the more common situation
where an accused infringer imposes a defense or counterclaim

114.
See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. 261, 282 (2016)
(noting that the patent system now “provides different tracks—one in the
Patent Office and one in the courts—for the review and adjudication of patent
claims”); Gugliuzza, (In)valid, supra note 3, at 273 (“Most patents in
post-issuance review at the PTO are also involved in litigation between the
same parties.”).
115. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (requiring inter partes review to be sought
within one year of service of a patent infringement complaint).
116. See id. § 315(a)(1)–(2) (inter partes review); id. § 325(a)(1)–(2)
(post-grant review).
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of invalidity in response to an infringement suit.117 Nor is ex
parte reexamination subject to these limitations.118
Second, a defendant in a federal court infringement case is
barred from seeking inter partes review more than one year
after being served in the federal litigation.119 This provision
limits the opportunity for a defendant to seek inter partes
review belatedly in the litigation when the risk of conflicting
invalidity decisions would be highest.120 However, inter partes
review could still be sought late in the litigation by someone
other than the infringement defendant (e.g., a defendant in later
filed litigation or a third party).121 And, once again, no such time
limit exists for ex parte reexamination.122
Third, a party that challenges a patent through inter partes
review or post grant review and receives a final written decision
from the PTAB is subsequently estopped from asserting
invalidity in litigation “on any ground that the petitioner raised
or reasonably could have raised.”123 This limits duplicative
invalidity proceedings when the patent owner prevails in the
PTAB, barring the continued maintenance even of some
invalidity arguments that were previously subject to a trial or
other resolution in litigation, provided that “the [c]ourt has not
entered a final judgment on the relevant ground” before the
PTAB’s final written decision.124 However, courts are split as to
117. See id. § 315(a)(3) (inter partes review); id. § 325(a)(3) (post-grant
review).
118. See id. § 302 (“Any person at any time may file a request for
reexamination . . . .”).
119. See id. § 315(b). An infringement defendant necessarily has a shorter
timeframe to seek post-grant review, which must be sought within nine
months of patent issuance. Id. § 321(c).
120. See id. § 315(b).
121. See, e.g., WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 889 F.3d 1308,
1314 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (litigation filed in 2009, jury verdict in 2012, and inter
partes review sought in 2014 and 2015 by a third party sued for infringement
after the jury verdict).
122. See 35 U.S.C. § 302 (“Any person at any time may file a request for
reexamination . . . .”).
123. Id. § 315(e)(2) (inter partes review); id. § 325(e)(2) (post-grant
review).
124. Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Par Pharm. Inc., No. 14-1289, 2019 WL
9343055, at *2–3 (D. Del. Apr. 11, 2019) (noting that this was an issue of first
impression).
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the breadth of the “reasonably could have raised” language.125
Moreover, the estoppel provisions have no effect on duplicative
proceedings until the PTAB’s decision and, even then, only if the
PTAB upholds (rather than invalidates) the claims.126 And, for
a third time, there is no comparable provision for
reexamination.127
Thus, the statute provides tools that prevent some, but not
all, duplicative invalidity proceedings from taking place. The
federal courts and PTAB also have discretionary tools to further
limit duplicative invalidity proceedings. Federal courts can
prevent the inefficiency and potential gamesmanship of
duplicative proceedings by staying litigation pending the PTAB
proceeding.128 If the PTAB invalidates the asserted claims, the
case can be dismissed without wasting resources or risking a
conflicting result. If the PTAB upholds the asserted claims,
estoppel will simplify the litigation if the defendant is also the
PTAB challenger (as noted above) and, even if not, the
defendant may have an incentive to settle knowing that the
PTAB has already rejected an invalidity challenge. Courts often
stay litigation pending PTAB proceedings.129
But Congress chose not to mandate or even tilt the scales in
favor of stays, as it has with other patent procedures.130 And
125. Christa J. Laser, The Scope of IPR Estoppel: A Statutory, Historical,
and Normative Analysis, 70 FLA. L. REV. 1127, 1158–65 (2018).
126. If the claims are invalidated, the Fresenius rule applies and estoppel
is irrelevant. See infra Part II.A.
127. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 302–307.
128.
See Gugliuzza, (In)valid, supra note 3, at 321–22 (describing stays of
litigation as the best way to prevent inconsistent outcomes between the PTAB
and the courts).
129. See Colleen Chien et al., Inter Partes Review and the Design of
Post-Grant Patent Reviews, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 817, 824 n.32 (2018)
(finding that 80 percent of stay requests pending inter partes review are
granted and nearly 40 percent of all cases with concurrent inter partes review
are stayed).
130. See Joel Sayres & Julie Wahlstrand, To Stay or Not to Stay Pending
IPR? That Should Be a Simpler Question, 17 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 52, 63
(noting that Congress specified factors to favor stays for covered business
method patent review but not inter partes review); see also 35 U.S.C. § 318
(2002) (pre-AIA) (creating presumption of litigation stay pending inter partes
reexamination unless the court “determines that a stay would not serve the
interests of justice”).
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judges frequently do not stay litigation.131 Sometimes judges
declining stays express the belief that a judicial forum is more
appropriate or optimal than an administrative forum for
resolving patent invalidity, notwithstanding Congress’s choices
to the contrary.132 More typically, the stay denial reflects timing
issues. The PTAB may not institute review until nearly a year
and a half into the litigation, given the twelve months litigation
defendants have to seek review, the three months the patent
owner has to respond to the request for PTAB review, and the
three months the PTAB has to decide whether to review the
patents.133 By that point, the litigation may have advanced
enough, perhaps even with some decisions on the merits, to
warrant the court denying a stay.134 Moreover, someone other
than the defendant could seek PTAB review when the litigation
is already at an advanced stage, or the defendant could seek
non-time-limited
reexamination,
as
noted
above.135
Alternatively, the PTAB proceeding may only involve a subset
of the claims at issue in litigation, such that the PTAB
proceeding will not substantially simplify the litigation to
warrant a stay.136
By contrast, a stay of PTAB proceedings would be
inconsistent with the strict statutory time limits for it to
complete its review.137 However, in recent years, the PTAB has
131. See Chien et al., supra note 129, at 824 n.32 (finding that less than 40
percent of all cases with concurrent inter partes review are stayed).
132. See Cont’l Intermodal Grp.-Trucking LLC v. Sand Revolution LLC,
No. 7:18-CV-00147 (W.D. Tex. July 22, 2020), ECF No. 105 (docket order
denying stay pending inter partes review because, in part, “[t]he Court
strongly believes the Seventh Amendment”).
133. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(c), 315(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(b) (inter partes
review); 35 U.S.C. §§ 321(c), 324(c); 37 C.F.R. § 42.207(b) (post-grant review).
134. See Gugliuzza, (In)valid, supra note 3, at 286 (noting that courts may
deny stays “if the accused infringer delays in seeking PTO review, if there are
patent claims in the case on which the PTO has not instituted review, or if the
parties are direct competitors in the market”).
135. See id. at 323.
136. See id. at 286 (“[C]ourts are generally perceived to be reluctant to
grant stays pending ex parte reexamination because outright invalidation of
the patent is rare in that proceeding.”).
137. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) (one-year deadline from inter partes review
institution, with one six-month extension allowed for good cause); id.
§ 326(a)(11) (same for post-grant review); see also Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849
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asserted a discretionary power to decline review of patents that
otherwise would qualify for review if, among other reasons,
there is a parallel district court proceeding with a close overlap
of parties and issues that is at an advanced stage, such as an
approaching trial date or with significant resources already
sunk into the litigation.138 This discretionary power could reduce
duplicative proceedings, depending on how broadly it is
construed, though its legitimacy and scope remain at issue and
the subject of ongoing rulemaking by the Patent Office.139
In sum, various existing patent law tools somewhat
mitigate the risk of duplicative proceedings arising from the
concurrent invalidity jurisdiction of the federal courts and
PTAB. Since these tools are limited, duplicative proceedings
where the federal courts and PTAB both decide the validity of
the same patent remain inevitable.140 Indeed, experience over
the past decade suggests that such duplicative proceedings are
common.141
2.

General Procedural Tools for Concurrent Jurisdiction:
Preclusion and Mootness

Although concurrent jurisdiction is comparatively new in
patent law, concurrent jurisdiction has long been common in
American law more generally—between federal and state
courts, courts of different states, and courts and administrative
tribunals.142 Two of the tools that have developed to manage the
overlapping power of various tribunals are relevant.
The common law doctrine of claim preclusion, often still
identified by the antiquated label res judicata, governs the effect

F.2d 1422, 1427 (1988) (“[Congress] did not give [the Patent Office Director]
authority to stay reexaminations; it told him [or her] to conduct them with
special dispatch.”).
138. Request for Comments on Discretion to Institute Trials Before the
Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 85 Fed. Reg. 66,502, 66,505 (Oct. 20, 2020) (to
be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42).
139. See id. (weighing the discretionary power’s pros and cons).
140. See Gugliuzza, (In)valid, supra note 3, at 325.
141. See infra Part II.A–B (discussing and citing cases).
142. See 15 MOORE’S, supra note 16, § 101.96.
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of a prior judgment on subsequent cases.143 Claim preclusion is
a hatchet that bars subsequent litigation of an entire claim.144
Claim preclusion provides that a prior final judgment on the
merits prevents the same parties from re-litigating the same
claim—defined to include all claims arising out of the same
operative facts—in subsequent litigation.145 Issue preclusion,
previously known as collateral estoppel, is a scalpel that does
not bar an entire claim but only re-litigation of certain issues.146
Specifically, when an issue was actually litigated, determined,
and essential to the judgment, issue preclusion bars anyone who
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the first case from
re-litigating the issue in subsequent litigation.147 When
re-litigation of the issue is necessary to prevail in the second
case, the practical effect of issue preclusion is to resolve the
second case, even if only a specific issue is technically barred.148
Mootness is a justiciability limit imposed by Article III of
the Constitution’s requirement that federal courts only hear
“Cases” or “Controversies.”149 “The mootness doctrine provides
that although there may be an actual and justiciable
controversy at the time the litigation is commenced, once that
controversy ceases to exist, the federal court must dismiss the

143. See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL & JOANNA C. SCHWARTZ, CIVIL PROCEDURE
703 (Wolters Kluwer 10th ed. 2019).
144. See id. at 704.
145. See id. at 704, 710.
146. See id. at 703.
147. See id. at 736.
148. See id.
149. Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 92 (2009). There are also forms of
prudential mootness, and some have suggested that mootness rests too broadly
on Article III jurisdictional considerations. See Matthew I. Hall, The Partially
Prudential Doctrine of Mootness, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 562, 565–66 (2009)
(advancing a theory of mootness grounded in prudential concerns); Evan Tsen
Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 603, 668 (1992) (“The mootness doctrine should be cut loose of its
constitutional moorings.”). Even some of these critics acknowledge that when
the issue itself is moot, as is true when a patent right is cancelled, see infra
Part III, rather than merely the plaintiff’s stake in the issue (e.g., ownership
of the patent right), mootness is a jurisdictional component of Article III. See
Hall, supra note 149, at 565–66. In any event, courts treat mootness as a
jurisdictional limit. 15 MOORE’S, supra note 16, § 101.91.
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action for want of jurisdiction.”150 Mootness “refer[s] to a case
that has expired, or otherwise has been deprived of vitality by
events occurring after the commencement of the action.”151
Mootness can arise either because the issue in the litigation
itself has expired or been extinguished and is therefore no longer
“live” or because one of the parties lost a legally cognizable
interest in the outcome.152 Some common mootness situations
include “if the controversy initially presented to the court has
been resolved during the pendency of the action, if either of the
parties experiences a change in his or her legal status while the
case is pending, or if the dispute has lost its adverse character
due to any other reason.”153 The doctrine of mootness is related
to standing “in the sense that it requires that a plaintiff have
continued standing throughout the duration of the action.”154
Mootness can overlap with preclusion when the mooting
event is the intervening decision of another tribunal that
resolves an issue crucial to the federal litigation.155 However,
mootness applies even in situations that do not qualify for
preclusion—e.g., a party lacked a prior opportunity to litigate
the issue—because mootness is “based purely on an analysis of
whether an actual controversy still exists, whether the parties
still have the requisite adversity of interests, and whether a
judicial remedy is still required and would provide effective
relief.”156 Unlike preclusion, “mootness analysis does not
necessarily require an identity of parties and claims [or issues],
but rather, involves a judicial inquiry into whether the
jurisprudential concerns underlying the mootness doctrine of
Article III militate against or in favor of entertaining the federal
lawsuit.”157

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

15 MOORE’S, supra note 16, § 101.90.
Hall, supra note 149, at 568.
U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396 (1980).
15 MOORE’S, supra note 16, § 101.90.
Id. § 101.94[1].
See id. § 101.96.
Id.
Id.
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II.

THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S CONFUSED, CRITICIZED, AND
MISGUIDED APPROACH TO DUPLICATIVE INVALIDITY
PROCEEDINGS

The inevitability of duplicative invalidity proceedings
raises the “critically important” question of what to do when the
federal courts and PTAB reach different results.158 If the PTAB
upholds a patent before a federal court reaches final judgment,
the statutory estoppel provisions will often prevent the court
from reaching a different result.159 And if the federal court first
invalidates a patent in a final judgment, the PTAB proceeding
becomes irrelevant because issue preclusion will bar the patent
owner from enforcing the invalidated claims.160 Thus, the real
question is what to do when the federal courts uphold the
validity of a patent but the PTAB invalidates it.
The Federal Circuit’s answer to this question is clear: PTAB
invalidation, once affirmed by the Federal Circuit, extinguishes
pending litigation and requires vacating any prior decisions on
infringement, validity, and damages.161 Far less clear is the
Federal Circuit’s rationale for this rule, which has left Federal
Circuit panels, district courts, and litigants confused.162
Commentators widely criticize this rule on doctrinal, policy, and
separation of powers grounds.163 This criticism is unsurprising,
given that the issue preclusion principles on which the Federal
Circuit most commonly relies are clearly inapplicable in this
context.164
A.

The Federal Circuit’s Rule that PTAB Invalidation
Trumps Litigation

For the first time in its 2013 decision in Fresenius USA, Inc.
v. Baxter International, Inc.,165 the Federal Circuit squarely
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Gugliuzza, (In)valid, supra note 3, at 273.
See supra Part I.C.1.
See supra Part I.A.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part II.D.
721 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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confronted the effect of PTAB invalidation on concurrent
litigation.166 Baxter’s infringement litigation began in 2003,
with a jury trial held in 2006.167 After various post-trial
machinations and a subsequent appeal, the Federal Circuit held
in September 2009 that some asserted claims were invalid as a
matter of law and others were not.168 That decision finalized
liability, with Fresenius found to have infringed the claims that
were not invalidated.169 But the Federal Circuit remanded to the
district court to address the remedial issue of whether the
invalidation of some claims required modification of the
injunction or royalty award.170 After the district court addressed
this issue on remand in 2011 and 2012, the appeal at issue in
the 2013 decision was filed.171
After Fresenius sought ex parte reexamination in 2005, the
examiner found the claims that were the basis of the
infringement judgment obvious in 2007, the PTAB’s predecessor
affirmed in 2010, and the Federal Circuit affirmed in 2012
(while the infringement case was on remand).172 The Patent
Office issued a certificate cancelling the relevant patent claims
in April 2013.173
In the second litigation appeal, the panel majority vacated
the district court’s remand judgment and remanded with
instructions to vacate the infringement and remedial
decisions.174 The Federal Circuit concluded that Baxter “no
longer ha[d] a viable cause of action in the pending case” because
of the intervening Federal Circuit affirmance of the
reexamination invalidation.175 Despite the conclusive resolution
of liability by the federal courts before this affirmance, the
166. The Federal Circuit had briefly addressed the issue in two prior
unpublished opinions but with very little reasoning. See Gugliuzza, (In)valid,
supra note 3, at 293–95.
167. Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1332.
168. Id. at 1332–33.
169. Id. at 1333.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1333–34.
172. Id. at 1334–35.
173. Id. at 1335.
174. Id. at 1347.
175. Id. at 1344–45.
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Federal Circuit found that the infringement litigation was not
completely final—so as to immunize it from the effects of
reexamination invalidation—because remedial issues were still
pending.176 In dissent, Judge Newman objected that the validity
issue was sufficiently final in litigation to be immune from
reexamination invalidation because the validity issue had been
conclusively resolved, with only remedial issues remaining.177
More broadly, she contended that “[t]he judicial decision of
patent validity is not available for review, revision, or
annulment by the PTO.”178
Due to the recent popularity of the PTAB, Federal Circuit
panels have repeatedly confronted the impact of PTAB
invalidation on pending litigation—consistently applying the
Fresenius rule that the invalidation, once affirmed, terminates
federal court litigation pending at any stage and requires
vacating prior decisions. This rule has been applied when the
litigation is in various procedural postures at the time the PTAB
invalidation is affirmed: (1) some progress in the district court
but no decision on the merits;179 (2) a jury verdict on liability and
damages but post-trial matters pending in the district court;180
(3) final judgment in the district court but pending on direct
appeal to the Federal Circuit on liability and damages issues;181
and (4) liability conclusively determined following appellate
review but the case pending on remedial or collateral issues.182

176. Id. at 1340–44.
177. See id. at 1353–60 (Newman, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 1364.
179. See, e.g., B.E. Tech., L.L.C. v. Facebook, Inc., 940 F.3d 675, 676–77,
679 (Fed. Cir. 2019); SHFL Ent., Inc. v. DigiDeal Corp., 729 F. App’x 931,
932– 34 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Target Training Int’l, Ltd. v. Extended Disc N. Am.,
Inc., 645 F. App’x 1018, 1020, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
180. See Hologic, Inc. v. Minerva Surgical, Inc., 957 F.3d 1256, 1263,
1266– 67 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Pers. Audio, LLC v. CBS Corp., 946 F.3d 1348, 1350
(Fed. Cir. 2020).
181. See Imperium IP Holdings (Cayman), Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 757
F. App’x 974, 975, 977, 980 (Fed. Cir. 2019); XY, LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics,
L.C., 890 F.3d 1282, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
182. See ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 790 F.3d 1307, 1351 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (case pending regarding the scope of injunction and contempt
sanctions).
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By contrast, the Federal Circuit has clarified that Fresenius
“does not allow reopening of a satisfied and unappealable final
judgment.”183 For example, in WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION
Geophysical Corp.,184 the parties stipulated to a final judgment
on infringement, validity, reasonable royalties, and enhanced
damages after full resolution in the district court and Federal
Circuit.185 Neither party appealed the stipulated final judgment
(and the time for appeal ran), the reasonable royalty was paid,
and a schedule was set for payment of the enhanced damages.186
Thus, these claims were no longer pending in federal court at
the time of PTAB invalidation, with the only claim remaining
being for lost profits damages, on which certiorari had been
sought and granted by the Supreme Court.187 The Federal
Circuit concluded “that the reasonable royalty award
constitute[d] a fully satisfied and unappealable final judgment,”
and that “ION cannot now reopen the agreed and fully paid
unappealable final judgment on the reasonable royalty based on
the subsequent invalidation of a subset of asserted patent
claims.”188 The intervening affirmance of PTAB invalidation
could still affect the pending lost profits claim, and the Federal
Circuit remanded to the district court to determine whether the
lost profits could be based solely on the one patent not
invalidated by the PTAB.189

183. WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 913 F.3d 1067, 1071
(Fed. Cir. 2019); see Versata Comput. Indus. Sols., Inc. v. SAP AG, 564 F. App’x
600, 600–01 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (affirming summarily and finding “without merit”
an infringer’s attempt to be relieved of a large monetary judgment where the
patent owner abandoned the only remaining issue on remand from the Federal
Circuit and final judgment was entered before PTAB invalidation).
184. 913 F.3d 1067 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
185. Id. at 1070.
186. Id.
187. See id. at 1071 (“The petition was granted with respect to the lost
profits award, and . . . the Supreme Court reversed our decision on lost profits,
holding that ‘WesternGeco’s damages award for lost profits was a permissible
domestic application of § 284.’”).
188. Id. at 1072.
189. Id. at 1073–75.
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The Federal Circuit’s Confused Rationale for Allowing
PTAB Invalidation to Trump Litigation

The Fresenius rule is clear, but its rationale is not. This
subpart describes the confused rationale in Fresenius, the
confusion in subsequent Federal Circuit and district court
decisions, and the problems this confusion has caused.
1.

The Ambiguity of Fresenius

The Fresenius panel majority based its conclusion primarily
on precedent from cases involving reissuance and judicial
invalidation.190 Beyond precedent, the panel majority both
suggested and rejected issue preclusion as the basis for its
decision.191 The panel majority described the case as “virtually
identical” to a previous case relying on the “defense” of collateral
estoppel, i.e., issue preclusion, to terminate pending litigation
after invalidation by another court.192 It also expressly relied on
preclusion principles to justify parts of its decision.193 And it
suggested preclusion principles by framing the question as
whether the PTAB invalidation “is binding in pending district
court infringement litigation.”194 The two members of the panel
majority (Chief Judge Prost and Judge Dyk) subsequently filed
an opinion concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc that
expressly noted that a different result “would contravene
controlling” Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent

190. See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1336–44
(Fed. Cir. 2013).
191. See id. at 1343–44, 1347.
192. See id. at 1343–44 (explaining the similarities between Fresenius’s
case and Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 26 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1994));
Gugliuzza, (In)valid, supra note 3, at 312 (“The Federal Circuit in
Fresenius . . . drew on Mendenhall and the common law of preclusion as the
basis for the absolute finality rule.”).
193. See Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1341 (relying on preclusion’s finality rules
to determine the finality of the present judgment); id. at 1347 (relying on
preclusion principles regarding the priority of conflicting judgments).
194. Id. at 1336; see also id. at 1339 (describing Congressional expectations
that “cancellation of claims during reexamination would be binding in
concurrent infringement litigation”).
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where “decisions were held not sufficiently final to bar the
preclusive effect of a final judgment in another case.”195
But elsewhere, the Fresenius majority explained that PTAB
invalidation “is binding not because of collateral estoppel, but
because Congress has expressly delegated reexamination
authority to the PTO under a statute requiring the PTO to
cancel rejected claims, and cancellation extinguishes the
underlying basis for suits based on the patent.”196 The panel
majority also made passing references to the mootness
doctrine.197 Its ultimate disposition stated that because “Baxter
no longer has a viable cause of action against Fresenius . . . the
pending litigation is moot.”198 Its statement that “Baxter’s
problem is that it no longer has a viable cause of action in the
pending case” also suggests mootness.199 And in a footnote, the
panel majority sought support from a Supreme Court reissue
case that it described as holding “that cancellation of a patent
mooted the [pending] appeal.”200
2.

The Confusion and Conflict in Post-Fresenius Cases

Subsequent Federal Circuit cases demonstrate confusion as
to the proper basis for the Fresenius rule. Some cases rely on
Fresenius as binding precedent without attempting to identify a
rationale.201 For example, in Personal Audio, LLC v. CBS
Corp.,202 the Federal Circuit concluded, without further
analysis, that the patent owner “made no argument at all for
distinguishing this case from the cases in which we held that
district court actions had to terminate when a [PTAB]
195. Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 733 F.3d 1369, 1372 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (Dyk, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (emphasis
added).
196. Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1344.
197. See id. at 1340 (“[I]n general, when a claim is cancelled, the patentee
loses any cause of action based on that claim, and any pending litigation in
which the claims are asserted becomes moot.”).
198. Id. at 1347.
199. Id. at 1344–45.
200. Id. at 1337 n.6.
201. See ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 789 F.3d 1349, 1358–61 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (extending Fresenius without identifying a basis for the decision).
202. 946 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
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unpatentability ruling as to the relevant patent claims was
affirmed on appeal.”203
When the Federal Circuit goes beyond precedent, issue
preclusion is its clearest and most common rationale.204 In XY,
LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics, L.C.,205 the Federal Circuit declined
to “address Trans Ova’s invalidity arguments as to the Freezing
Patent claims in view of our affirmance today in a separate
appeal [from the PTAB] invalidating these same claims, which
collaterally estops XY from asserting the patent in any further
proceedings.”206 It explained that the affirmance of PTAB
invalidation “has an immediate issue-preclusive effect on any
pending or co-pending actions involving the patent.”207 Notably,
the majority rejected the dissent’s suggestion that the decision
rested on mootness, relying instead on the Supreme Court’s
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois
Foundation decision about the preclusive effect of judicial
invalidation for the principle that “an affirmance of an invalidity
finding, whether from a district court or the Board, has a
collateral estoppel effect on all pending or co-pending actions.”208
Similarly, in Chrimar Systems, Inc. v. ALE USA Inc.,209 the
Federal Circuit held that “[t]his is such a case under
Fresenius . . . and related cases” where “[o]ur affirmance of the
Board’s decisions of unpatentability of the patent claims at issue
in the present case has ‘an immediate issue-preclusive effect on
any pending or co-pending actions involving the patent[s].’”210
A few Federal Circuit cases make cursory references to
mootness as the basis for the Fresenius rule, without any

203. Id. at 1354.
204. In addition to those discussed in the text, see Hologic, Inc. v. Minerva
Surgical, Inc., 957 F.3d 1256, 1266–67 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (stating that “Hologic
is collaterally estopped from asserting infringement of these claims”
invalidated by the PTAB) and Imperium IP Holdings (Cayman), Ltd. v.
Samsung Elecs. Co., 757 F. App’x 974, 980 (Fed Cir. 2019) (“Liability based on
those claims [invalidated by the PTAB], therefore, is now precluded.”).
205. 890 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
206. Id. at 1294.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. 785 F. App’x 854 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
210. Id. at 856 (citing XY, 890 F.3d at 1294).
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sustained analysis. In SHFL Entertainment, Inc. v. DigiDeal
Corp.,211 a non-precedential decision, the Federal Circuit
pointed to the passing reference to mootness in Fresenius as the
basis for terminating infringement litigation and concluded that
summary judgment was improper because “[s]uits based on
cancelled claims must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.”212
Another
non-precedential
decision,
Target
Training
International, Ltd. v. Extended Disc North America, Inc.,213
affirmed a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction under Article III
because PTAB invalidation mooted infringement litigation.214 In
a single precedential opinion invoking mootness, the Federal
Circuit simply noted “that the [PTAB]’s decision [invaliding
claims at issue] and our affirmance mooted any dispute over the
district court’s decision regarding [those] claims.”215
Unsurprisingly, the district courts also are confused as to
the basis for the Fresenius rule. Some just rely on Federal
Circuit precedent without addressing the underlying
rationale.216 Some view the Fresenius rule as an application of
issue preclusion.217 Others invoke mootness as the governing
211. 729 F. App’x 931 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
212. Id. at 934.
213. 645 F. App’x 1018 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
214. See id. at 1022–25 (“Because TTI failed to assert the newly added
claims, despite opportunities to do so, the district court did not err by
dismissing the case as moot.”); see also Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Rsch. Corp.
Techs., Inc., 914 F.3d 1366, 1368 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (declining to rule on
claims voluntarily cancelled in reexamination “[b]ecause there is no case or
controversy regarding the finally cancelled claims”).
215. See Indivior Inc. v. Dr. Reddy’s Lab’ys, S.A., 930 F.3d 1325, 1349 (Fed.
Cir. 2019); see also B.E. Tech., L.L.C. v. Facebook, Inc., 940 F.3d 675, 679 (Fed.
Cir. 2019) (endorsing district court dismissal of litigation as moot).
216. See, e.g., MonoSol Rx, LLC v. Biodelivery Scis. Int’l, Inc., No. 10-5695,
2015 WL 5679891, at *20 n.46 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2015); Am. Tech. Ceramics
Corp. v. Presidio Components, Inc., No. 14-CV-6544, 2018 WL 1525686, at *8
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2018); Ericsson Inc. v. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd.,
No. 2:15-cv-00011, 2018 WL 2149736, at *15 (E.D. Tex. May 10, 2018).
217. See, e.g., Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Capella Photonics, Inc., No. 20-cv-01858,
2020 WL 4923697, at *4–6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2020); Intell. Ventures I, LLC
v. Lenovo Grp. Ltd., 370 F. Supp. 3d 251, 256–58 (D. Mass. 2019);
Memorandum Opinion, Order, and Recommendation, C-Cation Techs., LLC v.
Time Warner Cable Inc., No. 2:14-cv-00059, 2017 WL 6498072, at *1 (E.D. Tex.
Dec. 19, 2017); see also Unisone Strategic IP, Inc. v. Life Techs. Corp., No.
13-cv-1278, 2019 WL 4015836, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2019) (“Since a final
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rationale,218 with at least one explicitly concluding (contrary to
some Federal Circuit precedent) that “[t]he Federal Circuit has
described this extinguishment as a matter of mootness, rather
than collateral estoppel.”219
Some post-Fresenius decisions mix the distinct concepts of
issue preclusion and mootness. In XY, the Federal Circuit
treated them as interchangeable, describing the Fresenius rule
as “apply[ing] collateral estoppel in mooting pending district
court findings of no invalidity based on intervening final
decisions of patent invalidity.”220 Similarly, a district court
purporting to apply issue preclusion concluded that “[w]hen a
claim is invalidated at the PTAB, and that decision is made
final, the cancellation of the claim carries preclusive effect in a
co-pending litigation because the cause of action is
extinguished.”221
3.

The Practical Consequences of the Different Rationales

The lack of governing rationale for the Fresenius rule causes
a variety of practical problems. Litigants and district courts
dispute whether the disposition of litigation after PTAB
invalidation is on the merits—as it would be under issue

PTAB judgment on the invalidity of a patent claim has an issue-preclusive
effect on any pending actions that involve that patent . . . [the] remaining
claims must be precluded.”).
218. See, e.g., Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l,
Inc., No. 04-1371, 2017 WL 6206382, at *2–3 (D. Del. Dec. 8, 2017); Transp.
Techs., LLC v. L.A. Metro. Transp. Auth., No. CV 15-6423, 2019 WL 2058630,
at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2019); Report and Recommendation, Brookins v.
Caterpillar Inc., No. 3:19-cv-29, 2019 WL 3758034, at *2–3 (D.N.D. June 26,
2019); Puget Bioventures, LLC v. Biomet Orthopedics LLC, 325 F. Supp. 3d
899, 904 (D. Ind. 2018); MyGo, L.L.C. v. Mission Beach Indus., L.L.C., No.
16-cv-2350, 2018 WL 3438650, at *2, *5 (S.D. Cal. July 17, 2018); Capella
Photonics, Inc. v. Cisco Sys. Inc., No. 14-cv-03348, 2019 WL 4242665, at *2–3
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2019).
219. B.E. Tech., L.L.C. v. Groupon, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-02781, 2017 WL
11139705, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 20, 2017).
220. XY, LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics, L.C., 890 F.3d 1282, 1294 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (emphasis added).
221. Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 403 F. Supp. 3d
571, 601–02 (E.D. Tex. 2019) (emphasis added).
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preclusion—or jurisdictional—as it would under mootness.222 A
2018 Central District of California decision entered judgment on
the merits because Fresenius “does not address subject matter
jurisdiction,”223 whereas a 2019 Northern District of California
decision cited and rejected that case because cases affected by
PTAB invalidation “must be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.”224
Relatedly, litigants and district courts disagree whether
resolution is properly via dismissal (the normal resolution on
jurisdictional grounds) or summary judgment (the normal
means of resolving a case based on preclusion). A 2018 Southern
District of California decision flatly stated that “[s]ummary
judgment is not appropriate as to these claims because they are
now moot,”225 whereas a 2019 District of Massachusetts case
granted summary judgment based on collateral estoppel.226
Alternatively, litigants and courts agree on dismissal but
disagree if it should be without prejudice (as is proper for
jurisdictional dismissals) or with prejudice (as is proper for
merits resolutions like preclusion).227
This
uncertainty
about
the
proper
resolution—jurisdictional or not, summary judgment or
dismissal, with prejudice or without prejudice—resulting from
222. See supra Part I.C.2.
223. Munchkin, Inc. v. Luv N’ Care, Ltd., No. CV 13-06787, 2018 WL
7507424, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 2, 2018).
224. Capella Photonics, Inc. v. Cisco Sys. Inc., No. 14-cv-03348, 2019 WL
4242665, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2019).
225. MyGo, L.L.C. v. Mission Beach Indus., L.L.C., No. 16-cv-2350, 2018
WL 3438650, at *6 (S.D. Cal. July 17, 2018).
226. See Intell. Ventures I, 370 F. Supp. 3d at 258 (“[C]laim 11 is invalid
on the basis of collateral estoppel.”).
227. Compare Transp. Techs., L.L.C. v. L.A. Metro. Transp. Auth., No. CV
15-6423, 2019 WL 2058630, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2019) (“Dismissals for
mootness must be without prejudice because federal courts lack jurisdiction to
reach the merits of a mooted claim.” (internal quotation omitted)); Power
Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., No. 04-1371, 2017 WL
6206382, at *2–3 (D. Del. Dec. 8, 2017) (explaining that courts must dismiss
claims without prejudice when they do not reach the merits of the case), with
Arlington Indus., Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., No. 3:06-CV-1105, 2015 WL
1470710, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2015) (“[I]t is well-established that a
plaintiff’s motion to dismiss with prejudice should only be denied if the
defendant would suffer significant prejudice as a result.”).
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the confusion about the basis for the Fresenius rule is not a mere
procedural technicality but has important consequences. A final
judgment on the merits—like summary judgment but not a
jurisdictional dismissal without prejudice—has claim preclusive
effect in later litigation.228 This could bar later infringement
actions even for patent claims not asserted in the first case if
they arise from the same operative facts (e.g., the same
products).229
The type of resolution also could affect whether the
defendant is a “prevailing party” as necessary to recover costs
and attorney’s fees. To be fair, the Federal Circuit has found
“prevailing party” status even where the district court dismissed
a case as moot based on an intervening PTAB invalidation,
without specifying with or without prejudice, because there was
a “decision with judicial imprimatur.”230 A subsequent district
court case, after dismissing without prejudice as moot,
distinguished the Federal Circuit’s decision, purporting to apply
the general rule that dismissals without prejudice cannot confer
prevailing party status because they do not alter the parties’
legal relationship.231 And the Federal Circuit has affirmed the
denial of prevailing party status where the patent owner
voluntarily dismissed the action without prejudice after PTAB
invalidation, but focused on the lack of the judicial imprimatur
for a voluntary dismissal.232
Finally, whether the Fresenius rule is based on issue
preclusion or mootness affects the procedure for raising and
resolving the intervening PTAB invalidation. Mootness is a
jurisdictional issue that cannot be waived, can be raised by any

228. See 18 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE—CIVIL
§ 131.30[3][a] (2021).
229. See id. § 131.20[2].
230. B.E. Tech., L.L.C. v. Facebook, Inc., 940 F.3d 675, 678 (Fed. Cir.
2019).
231. See Transp. Techs., 2019 WL 2058630, at *2–3, *3 n.4 (“[C]ourts have
only conferred prevailing party status where a case is dismissed with
prejudice.”).
232. See O.F. Mossberg & Sons, Inc. v. Timney Triggers, L.L.C., 955 F.3d
990, 992–93 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“[W]e held that a dismissal for mootness imparts
sufficient judicial imprimatur to satisfy the prevailing party inquiry.”).
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party at any time, and can be raised sua sponte by the court.233
Issue preclusion is an affirmative merits defense and is
generally waived if not properly raised,234 though courts may
choose to raise it sua sponte.235
C.

The Extensive Criticism of the Fresenius Rule

The conclusion of Fresenius that PTAB invalidation, once
affirmed, trumps pending litigation and prior judicial decisions
has been heavily criticized by judges, scholars, and others. Most
obviously, the Federal Circuit twice split nearly evenly on
petitions for rehearing en banc. The petition for rehearing en
banc was denied in Fresenius but over the strong dissents of four
of the ten Federal Circuit judges.236 Two years later, the Federal
Circuit again denied rehearing en banc on the issue in another
case, this time by an even vote of five to five.237 Several panel
dissents have likewise objected to allowing PTAB invalidation
to trump pending litigation and prior judicial decisions.238 Even
Supreme Court Justice Gorsuch expressed concern about the
Fresenius rule in a case that had nothing to do with it.239

233. See 15 MOORE’S, supra note 16, § 101.92.
234. See FPP, supra note 33, § 4405.
235. See id. § 4405 n.10.
236. See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 733 F.3d 1369, 1370 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (denial of rehearing en banc).
237. See ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 790 F.3d 1307, 1308 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (denial of rehearing en banc).
238. See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1364 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The court’s ruling that PTO
reexamination overrides the prior adjudication of patent validity is contrary
to the legislative purposes of reexamination, offensive to principles of litigation
finality and repose, and violative of the Constitution.”); ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson
Software, Inc. 789 F.3d 1349, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (O’Malley, J., dissenting)
(“I believe that the majority incorrectly holds that Fresenius II requires that
we vacate the compensatory contempt award in light of In re ePlus.”); XY, LLC
v. Trans Ova Genetics, L.C., 890 F.3d 1282, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Newman,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“My concern is
with the holding that the district court’s judgment of validity of the Freezing
Patent is ‘moot’ on the ground of collateral estoppel.”).
239. See Thryv, Inc. v. Click-to-Call Techs., L.P., 140 S. Ct. 1367, 1388
(2020) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Fresenius rule as allowing
PTAB decision to displace a court’s determination).
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The leading scholarly treatment of the issue, by Professor
Paul Gugliuzza, concluded that there was “reason to at least be
skeptical” of the Fresenius approach, which “deserve[d] close
scrutiny” because it was “problematic.”240 Likewise, Professor
Paul Janicke has described the Patent Office invalidating a
claim previously upheld by the federal courts as a “problem” that
is “the very opposite of what was envisioned by Congress in the
initial legislation.”241 Several student notes242 and practitioner
articles243 also object to the Fresenius rule.
Some critics limit their concern to the most extreme version
of the Fresenius rule—when conclusive judicial determinations
of infringement and invalidity that have been affirmed on
appellate review are vacated because the case was still pending
on remedial or ministerial matters.244 Many critics go further
and object to giving effect to the PTAB proceedings anytime it
would require vacating a prior district court or jury
determination on validity, even prior to appellate review.245 And
240. Gugliuzza, (In)valid, supra note 3, at 274, 308, 310.
241. Paul M. Janicke, An Interim Proposal for Fixing Ex Parte Patent
Reexamination’s Messy Side, 4 HOUS. L. REV.: OFF REC. 43, 47–48 (2013); see
also Michael S. Greve, Exceptional, After All and After Oil States: Judicial
Review and the Patent System, 26 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 39 (2020)
(describing the Fresenius rule as “doubly problematic”).
242. See, e.g., Picozzi, supra note 3, at 2534 (finding Fresenius
unpersuasive and advocating for judicial discretion); Peggy P. Ni, Note,
Rethinking Finality in the PTAB Age, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 557, 576–78
(2016) (arguing that Lawson and Fresenius create issues of unfairness and
gamesmanship).
243. See, e.g., N. Scott Pierce, Double Jeopardy: Patents of Invention as
Contracts, Invention Disclosure as Consideration, and Where Oil States Went
Wrong, 30 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 645, 723–30 (2020)
(“Clearly, the odds are stacked against patentees, and the opportunities for
gamesmanship are many.”); see also Shashank Upadhye & Adam Sussman, A
Real Separation of Powers or Separation of Law: Can an Article I
Administrative Agency Nullify an Article III Federal Court Judgment?, 25
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 33–38 (2014) (rejecting some but
endorsing other concerns about the Fresenius rule).
244. See, e.g., Gugliuzza, (In)valid, supra note 3, at 314, 316 (focusing
concern on cases where there was a prior conclusive determination on
liability); Fresenius, 733 F.3d at 1373 (O’Malley, J., dissenting from the denial
of rehearing en banc) (objecting to allowing PTAB invalidation to trump where
liability had been conclusively resolved at the district court and on appeal).
245. See, e.g., XY, LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics, L.C., 890 F.3d 1282, 1299
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (Newman, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
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some critics go so far as to suggest that PTAB invalidation can
never affect pending litigation, even without any prior decision
in the litigation,246 or affect the validity of patents previously
upheld by the judiciary even in future litigation filed after the
PTAB proceedings.247
Gugliuzza has usefully separated the criticisms of the
Fresenius rule into three categories: (1) doctrinal; (2) separation
of powers; and (3) policy.248 Gugliuzza makes a persuasive case
that “contrary to the [Fresenius] court’s contentions, [the
precedent] do[es] not clearly indicate how to resolve conflicting
decisions between a court and the PTO in concurrent
proceedings.”249 Three Federal Circuit judges have similarly
concluded that “[t]here is no support in precedent for nullifying
judicial rulings of infringement and injunction, retroactively,
dissenting in part) (“[T]hat separate action [affirming PTAB invalidation]
cannot justify our discard of the district court’s judgment as ‘mooted’ by the
agency decision. The law of collateral estoppel does not contemplate that
result.”); Brief for Biotechnology Industry Organization as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 3, Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Fresenius USA, Inc., 572 U.S.
1115 (2014) (arguing that the effects of PTAB invalidation “should not be
available to an infringer after a district court has finally adjudicated patent
validity and awarded infringement damages against it”).
246. See XY, 890 F.3d at 1298 (Newman, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part) (“[The] holding that judicial authority is estopped
by an administrative agency ruling between non-mutual parties warrants
attention to the constitutional balance among the branches of government.”);
see also Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1346 (describing “a view, expressed by Judge
Newman in various other cases, that PTO reexamination cannot affect
pending infringement suits”).
247. See Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1349 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The PTO
can neither invalidate, nor revive, a patent whose validity the court has
adjudicated.”); id. at 1351 (finding “no hint of an intent that a PTO
reexamination decision would override a prior judicial decision rendered in
either prior or concurrent litigation”). Judge Newman suggested that her
position may not be as strong as some of her comments indicated. Fresenius
USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 733 F.3d 1369, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Newman,
J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). But other judges who both
supported and opposed the Fresenius rule understood Judge Newman to take
this strong position. See id. at 1370 (Dyk, J., concurring in the denial of
rehearing en banc); id. at 1372 (O’Malley, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc).
248. See Gugliuzza, (In)valid, supra note 3, at 274.
249. Id. at 310; see also Picozzi, supra note 3, at 2527 (“Precedent neither
requires nor forbids the court’s approach.”).
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based on a subsequent decision of the Patent and Trademark
Office.”250 In particular, critics object to the Federal Circuit’s
reliance on issue preclusion, contending that the Fresenius rule
is inconsistent with black letter issue preclusion doctrine.251
Beyond precedent, judicial critics have vigorously objected
to the Fresenius rule on separation of powers grounds. Federal
Circuit Judge O’Malley criticized the conclusion that “a decision
of the PTO, an administrative agency under a coordinate branch
of government, can displace a judgment of an Article III court”
as “ignor[ing] the role of Article III courts in our constitutional
structure.”252 Federal Circuit Judge Newman even more
strongly objected that it “violates the constitutional plan” by
allowing an administrative agency “to override and void the
final judgment of a federal Article III Court of Appeals.”253 In
her view, the Fresenius rule means that “the prior final
adjudication by this court of validity and infringement is
irrelevant, and that the later decision by the PTO overrides and
displaces our prior adjudication, depriving the parties to that
adjudication of their binding judgments.”254 This, according to
250. See ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 790 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); ePlus,
Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 789 F.3d 1349, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (O’Malley,
J., dissenting) (“The majority’s approach is contrary to the well-established
law of finality when the merits of an issue are conclusively decided.”);
Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 733 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(O’Malley, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“Under no
reasonable application of the law, however, could the PTO’s actions eradicate
that judgment.”).
251. See Gugliuzza, (In)valid, supra note 3, at 311–12 (“In cases involving
concurrent proceedings in the courts and at the PTO . . . a critical element of
issue preclusion is missing because the PTO applies a lower standard of
proof . . . .”); XY, 890 F.3d at 1298 (Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing that black
letter issue preclusion principles do not justify PTAB invalidation priority);
Brief of National Small Business Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 4, Chrimar Sys., Inc. v. Ale USA Inc., 141 S. Ct. 160 (2020) (“In
Fresenius . . . the Federal Circuit established an idiosyncratic view of issue
preclusion . . . .”).
252. ePlus, 789 F.3d at 1370 (O’Malley, J., dissenting).
253. Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1347 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (Newman, J., dissenting); see also Fresenius, 733 F.3d at 1383
(Newman, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (objecting to
“routinely subjecting Article III judgments to agency override”).
254. Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1348 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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Judge Newman, violates the principle that “[a]n agency of the
executive branch cannot override or revise or ignore, or deny
faith and credit to, the judgment of an Article III court.”255
Scholars are more cautious. Gugliuzza recognized that the
Fresenius rule “does not necessarily violate Supreme Court
caselaw on separation of powers” because that precedent
involved direct review of judicial decisions by the executive or
Congressional efforts to overturn litigation that was completely
final and terminated in the courts.256 Yet Gugliuzza still
suggested that it “is in tension with Supreme Court caselaw on
separation of powers, which forbids administrative agencies
from altering definitive court decisions” and is “in tension with
the basic policy that the federal courts should have the last word
on cases within their jurisdiction.”257 Similarly, Janicke
recognized that allowing PTAB invalidation to trump pending
litigation was not illegitimate but noted that “to outside
observers unfamiliar with the niceties of differing burdens of
proof and other legalistic constructs, the outcome seemed to
place the PTO above the courts on several questions of law.”258
Finally, judges, scholars, and others have objected to
allowing PTAB invalidations to trump pending litigation and
prior judicial decisions on policy grounds. Some Federal Circuit
judges have indicated a policy preference for the dominance of
federal courts in patent litigation inconsistent with Congress’s
increasing grant of authority over patent validity to the Patent
Office.259 More commonly, critics object that “it seems unfair and
inefficient to give someone a court has held to be a patent
infringer a second chance to avoid liability.”260 For example,
255. Id.
256. Gugliuzza, (In)valid, supra note 3, at 308–10.
257. Id. at 276, 310.
258. Janicke, supra note 241, at 52.
259. See Fresenius, 733 F.3d at 1383 (O’Malley, J., dissenting from the
denial of rehearing en banc) (“The panel majority’s decision in this case goes a
long way toward rendering district courts meaningless in the resolution of
patent infringement disputes.”); ePlus, 789 F.3d at 1370 (O’Malley, J.,
dissenting) (“The majority’s approach to finality will further displace the
critical role of district courts in patent infringement suits.”).
260. See Gugliuzza, (In)valid, supra note 3, at 276 (noting some policy
considerations going the other way); see also Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter
Int’l, Inc., 733 F.3d 1369, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (O’Malley, J., dissenting
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Federal Circuit Judge Moore criticized the fact that the
Fresenius rule “permit[ted] defendants to snatch victory from
the already closed jaws of defeat” as “wasteful of judicial,
executive, and party resources” and “just plain unfair.”261 Critics
also worry that the Fresenius rule encourages “gamesmanship”
and “abus[e]” by “encourage[ing] defendants to scrap and fight
to keep underlying litigation pending in the hope that they will
fare better with the PTO and then be able to unravel the district
court judgment against them.”262 And some critics worry that
allowing PTAB invalidation to trump pending litigation and
prior judicial decisions strikes at patent law’s very purpose to
promote innovation by “weaken[ing] that incentive [provided by
the patent], by reducing the reliability of the patent grant, even
when the patent has been sustained in litigation.”263
Critics have proposed a variety of solutions to the perceived
problems with the Fresenius rule. Many seek to prevent
different outcomes in concurrent PTAB and judicial proceedings
by means such as more frequent (or presumptive or mandatory)
judicial stays or aligning the burdens of proof in the forums.264
Some have gone so far as to suggest that the Patent Office’s
concurrent jurisdiction over validity should be eliminated, in
from the denial of rehearing en banc) (describing the Fresenius rule as “both
incorrect and ill-advised” because it made trial courts less accessible, less
streamlined and efficient, and less fair); Janicke, supra note 241, at 47 (“[T]he
accused infringer has two bites at the validity question, with attendant costs
and delays, the very opposite of what was envisioned by Congress in the initial
legislation.”).
261. ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 790 F.3d 1307, 1315 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (Moore, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
262. See id. at 1314–15; see also Fresenius, 733 F.3d at 1382–83 (Newman,
J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (“I emphasize the
gamesmanship and abuses that are now facilitated, with no balancing benefit
to the public.”).
263. Fresenius, 733 F.3d at 1382 (Newman, J., dissenting from the denial
of rehearing en banc).
264. See Gugliuzza, (In)valid, supra note 3, at 276, 327–30 (explaining
greater use of stays and aligning burden of proof); Ni, supra note 242, at 584
(“Nearly automatic stays of district court litigation until resolution of a PTO
proceeding would prevent contradictory determinations of validity at the
courts and the PTO.”); Nick Messana, Reexamining Reexamination:
Preventing a Second Bite at the Apple in Patent Validity Disputes, 14 NW. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 217, 231 (2016) (stating that Congress should
“encourage the use of these stays”).
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part to prevent different results from the federal courts.265 When
different results do occur, many critics propose making federal
court decisions, or at least conclusive decisions, immune from
the effects of PTAB cancellation.266 Others suggest giving
federal judges discretion to decide whether to give effect to the
PTAB cancellation when there has already been a judicial
validity decision (or perhaps only a conclusive decision).267
Gugliuzza roots his discretionary proposal in law of the case, a
discretionary doctrine by which courts should adhere to their
own prior rulings in the same case absent exceptional
circumstances.268 Gugliuzza suggests that PTAB invalidation
would typically be an exceptional circumstance to depart from
previous decisions in the litigation, but the court would retain
the discretion to decline to do so if the circumstances
warranted.269
D.

The Federal Circuit’s Blatant Error in Relying on
Preclusion Principles

The critics of the Fresenius rule are undoubtedly correct in
one regard. The issue preclusion principles commonly invoked
by the Federal Circuit are inapplicable. Gugliuzza curtly
dismissed the relevance of issue preclusion without much
analysis because “a key element of issue preclusion is not
satisfied in parallel court and PTO proceedings on patent
265. See Pierce, supra note 243, at 730–32 (arguing that eliminating the
Patent Office’s independent invalidity power is the only way to prevent
competing decisions).
266. See Ni, supra note 242, at 579–80 (suggesting that judgments should
be final for PTAB invalidation purposes if the judgment would be final for
appeal); Betsy Johnson, Plugging the Holes in the Ex Parte Reexamination
Statute: Preventing a Second Bite at the Apple for a Patent Infringer, 55 CATH.
U. L. REV. 305, 338 (2006) (“[T]he Federal Circuit should set a firm precedent
not allowing reexaminations to control or alter the final judgments of a district
court.” (emphasis added)).
267. See Picozzi, supra note 3, at 2520 (“[D]istrict courts would have the
discretion to adhere to their prior remedy decisions despite intervening
administrative judgments of invalidity.”).
268. See Gugliuzza, (In)valid, supra note 3, at 317.
269. See id. at 318–19 (“Yet the law of the case doctrine is directed toward
the court’s sound discretion and encourages the court to consider whether
departing from a prior ruling would be fair or efficient.”).
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validity.”270 Some district judges have recognized the problems
with an issue preclusion rationale but assumed the Federal
Circuit adopted a special patent-only form of issue preclusion. A
Northern District of California judge interpreted the precedent
as requiring that “collateral estoppel effect should be given to
PTAB invalidations even where the traditional elements of
collateral estoppel are not technically satisfied.”271 Similarly, a
District of Massachusetts judge recognized that the reliance on
issue preclusion was contrary to “black letter law” but
understood the precedent to hold that it was “necessitated by
the IPR statutory scheme.”272
This subpart provides the sustained analysis largely
missing to date demonstrating how the Federal Circuit’s use of
issue preclusion to justify the Fresenius rule disregards basic
preclusion principles. The Federal Circuit’s twisting of
preclusion rules is another example of its patent-exceptional
approach to even general procedural issues.273 The Supreme
Court has repeatedly rejected the Federal Circuit’s patent
exceptionalism, insisting that patent cases adhere to generally
applicable procedural rules.274
1.

Different Burdens of Proof Bar Issue Preclusion

PTAB invalidation is not entitled to issue preclusive effect
in pending litigation because the two proceedings do not present
the “same issue” within the meaning of black letter preclusion
doctrine. The “same issue” considers “not only [the] substantive
contours but also the procedural conditions under which [the

270. Id. at 275, 289.
271. Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Capella Photonics, Inc., No. 20-cv-01858, 2020 WL
4923697, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2020).
272. Intell. Ventures I, LLC v. Lenovo Grp. Ltd., 370 F. Supp. 3d 251, 256
(D. Mass. 2019).
273. See Gugliuzza, Federal Circuit, supra note 3, at 1817–18 (explaining
patent exceptionalism as “the Federal Circuit’s tendency to insist that general
legal principles, such as jurisdictional standards, do not apply in patent cases
because patent law is ‘different’”).
274. See id. at 1818 (collecting Supreme Court cases rejecting patent
exceptionalism in three contexts: “declaratory judgment standing, remedies
for patent infringement, and review of administrative agencies”).
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issue] was determined.”275 In particular, issue preclusion
applies only if a resolution under the burden of proof in the first
proceeding would necessarily also determine the issue under the
burden of proof in the second proceeding.276 Specifically, “a party
who has carried the burden of establishing an issue by a
preponderance of the evidence is not entitled to assert
preclusion in a later action that requires proof of the same issue
by a higher standard.”277 That the plaintiff in the first case
provided enough evidence to satisfy the preponderance burden
does not establish that they had enough evidence to meet a
higher burden of proof.278
This basic preclusion principle alone means that the PTAB
invalidation is not entitled to issue-preclusive effect in pending
district court litigation.279 The PTAB uses a preponderance of
the evidence burden for invalidity, whereas the district courts
use the higher clear and convincing evidence burden.280 Merely
because the PTAB found that it was more likely than not that
the patent was invalid—the preponderance standard—does not
establish that there is clear and convincing evidence that the
patent is invalid.281
The difference in burden of proof between the PTAB and the
federal courts demonstrates the Federal Circuit’s error in
concluding that PTAB invalidation priority “is a straightforward

275. YEAZELL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at 736–37.
276. Id. at 736–37; see also FPP, supra note 33, § 4422 (“Issue preclusion,
although not claim preclusion, may be defeated by shifts in the burden of
persuasion or by changes in the degree of persuasion required.”).
277. FPP, supra note 33, § 4422.
278. YEAZELL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at 737 (stating that because
civil and criminal proceedings operate under different standards of proof, a
decision in a civil case may not preclude an issue in a criminal case).
279. See Gugliuzza, (In)valid, supra note 3, at 275 (noting that issue
preclusion should be inapplicable “in parallel court and PTO proceedings on
patent validity because the two bodies use different legal standards to resolve
the dispute”).
280. See supra Part I.AB.1.
281. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 284–85 (1991) (noting that
because an earlier determination of fraud was based on a preponderance of the
evidence standard, “the prior judgment could not be given collateral estoppel
effect” in a later bankruptcy proceeding if the burden was clear and convincing
evidence).
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application of this court’s and Supreme Court precedent” on
issue preclusion.282 The Federal Circuit pointed to the Supreme
Court’s reliance on issue preclusion in Blonder-Tongue.283 But
Blonder-Tongue involved two infringement cases pending in
federal court, both of which used the clear and convincing
evidence standard to determine invalidity.284 The Federal
Circuit also cited its prior decision relying on issue preclusion in
a case where both proceedings were before the PTAB and subject
to the same preponderance of the evidence burden.285 These
cases are consistent with black letter preclusion principles
because the burden of proof remained the same. By contrast,
issue preclusion is inapplicable in the Fresenius context because
of the higher burden of proof in litigation than the PTAB.
2.

Additional Departures from Basic Issue Preclusion
Doctrine

While the different burdens of proof are enough to make
PTAB invalidation irrelevant to pending litigation under issue
preclusion principles, the Federal Circuit’s reliance on issue
preclusion to justify the Fresenius rule is inconsistent with
several other aspects of basic issue preclusion doctrine.
First, when there are competing proceedings, the first to
reach final judgment is entitled to preclusive effect in the other
proceeding.286 As discussed further below, final judgment in this
context refers to a final judgment in the lower tribunal,
regardless of any pending appeals. But the Federal Circuit
allows a second-in-time PTAB judgment to preclude a
first-in-time district court judgment. The Federal Circuit has
282. XY, LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics, L.C., 890 F.3d 1282, 1294 (Fed. Cir.
2018).
283. See id. at 1294 (“This court has long applied the Supreme Court’s
holding in Blonder-Tongue to apply collateral estoppel in mooting pending
district court findings of no invalidity based on intervening final decisions of
patent invalidity.”).
284. See Blonder-Tongue Lab’ys, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313,
335 (1971).
285. See XY, 890 F.3d at 1294 (citing MaxLinear, Inc. v. CF CRESPE
L.L.C., 880 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).
286. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. l (AM. L. INST.
1982).
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(correctly) declined to give preclusive effect to the first-in-time
PTAB judgment because of the differing burden of proof—the
defendant’s failure to prove invalidity by clear and convincing
evidence does not preclude a PTAB determination of invalidity
by the lower preponderance of evidence burden.287 But then the
Federal Circuit (incorrectly) gives the second-in-time PTAB
judgment preclusive effect despite the higher burden of proof in
litigation.288
Second, the Federal Circuit treats its affirmance of the
PTAB’s invalidity judgment as the trigger for issue preclusion,
rather than the PTAB’s own invalidity judgment.289 In XY, the
Federal Circuit explained that its “affirmance renders final a
judgment on the invalidity of the Freezing Patent, and has an
immediate issue-preclusive effect on any pending or co-pending
actions involving the patent.”290 The court expressly rejected the
preclusive effect of the PTAB decision absent affirmance.291
However, a final determination of the trial court, or other
tribunal of the first instance, is entitled to preclusive effect.292
The finality sufficient to permit preclusion is often analogized to
287. See In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1364–65 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(finding that the Patent Office legitimately invalidated a patent that the
district court had previously upheld “because the two proceedings necessarily
applied different burdens of proof and relied on different records”); see also
FPP, supra note 33, § 4422 (“Failure to carry a special burden of persuasion
characterized as requiring clear and convincing evidence or some like showing
does not preclude a later attempt to prove the same issue by a preponderance
of the evidence.”).
288. See supra Part II.D.1.
289. See XY, 890 F.3d at 1294 (“[A]n affirmance of an invalidity finding,
whether from a district court or the [PTAB], has a collateral estoppel effect on
all pending or co-pending actions.”).
290. Id.
291. See id (“We do not find . . . ’in the event of conflict the administrative
agency’s decision moots the district court’s decision.’”).
292. See FPP, supra note 33, § 4432 (“Traditionally, finality was identified
for purposes of preclusion in much the same way as it was identified for
purposes of appeal.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83(1)
(AM. L. INST. 1982) (explaining that, subject to inapplicable exceptions, “a valid
and final adjudicative determination by an administrative tribunal has the
same effects under the rules of res judicata, subject to the same exceptions and
qualifications, as a judgment of a court”); B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis
Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 148–51 (2015) (endorsing the Second Restatement’s
position).
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the finality necessary to appeal.293 Thus, “the rule [is] that a
final trial-court judgment operates as res judicata while an
appeal is pending.”294 If the Fresenius rule is based on issue
preclusion, litigation should be terminated upon the PTAB’s
final determination, without the need for Federal Circuit
affirmance. Although this would raise complications if the PTAB
were reversed on appeal, issue preclusion doctrine addresses
these familiar complications through protective measures in the
second action, not denying issue preclusive effect to the first
action.295
Third, the Federal Circuit treats PTAB invalidation as an
automatic bar to pending litigation, explaining that PTAB
invalidation “has an immediate issue-preclusive effect” on “all
pending or co-pending actions.”296 However, as a Federal Circuit
dissent noted,297 substantial flexibility and exceptions pervade
issue preclusion to ensure that barring re-litigation is fair under
the circumstances.298 Of particular relevance, preclusion can be
denied if there are “differences in the quality or extensiveness of
the procedures followed in the two courts,”299 including
“differences in the rules of discovery or inability to make full use
of discovery or evidence in the first forum,”300 the inability to
“call witnesses” in the first action,301 or “substantial differences
in the rules of evidence.”302
Discovery in PTAB proceedings is generally limited to
exhibits cited by the opposing party, information inconsistent
293. FPP, supra note 33, § 4432.
294. Id. § 4433.
295. See id. (suggesting staying or dismissing the second action if an
appeal is pending in the first action).
296. XY, LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics, L.C., 890 F.3d 1282, 1294 (Fed. Cir.
2018).
297. See id. at 1300 (Newman, J., dissenting).
298. See FPP, supra note 33, § 4426 (“A final limitation on issue preclusion
may be found in occasional statements that it ‘should not be exercised in such
a manner as to work an injustice.’”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 28 (AM. L. INST. 1982) (explaining five instances when issue preclusion may
not apply despite the issue being litigated with a final judgment).
299. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(3) (AM. L. INST. 1982).
300. FPP, supra note 33, § 4423.
301. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 n.15 (1979).
302. FPP, supra note 33, § 4423.
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with the other party’s position in the proceeding, and a
deposition of the other party’s expert declarant.303 For anything
else, “the high burden placed on a party seeking [additional]
discovery . . . has resulted in the Board granting discovery in
only limited situations.”304 This contrasts with “the expansive
discovery common in district court” litigation.305 Similarly,
whereas live testimony and cross-examination are hallmarks of
district court trials, PTAB proceedings are generally limited to
counsel argument.306 The PTAB “will only rarely allow live
witness testimony.”307 Normally, direct testimony occurs via
witness declarations and cross-examination occurs through
depositions, with only the transcript, not the video, submitted to
the PTAB.308
These procedural differences may not be significant enough
to prevent issue preclusion in most parallel PTAB and district
court proceedings.309 But some invalidity issues are so
fact-intensive that the differences in discovery and witness
testimony between the PTAB and district court litigation may
affect the outcome of the invalidity issue.310 The Federal
Circuit’s absolute preclusion rule is therefore inconsistent with
the flexibility of issue preclusion that accounts for potentially
significant differences in discovery or witness testimony.311

303. See Michael J. Flibbert & Maureen D. Queler, 5 Distinctions Between
IPRs and District Court Patent Litigation, CORP. COUNS. (Dec. 16, 2015),
https://www.perma.cc/2743-TCAL.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. See id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. See B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 158–59
(2015) (noting that procedural differences do not necessarily prevent issue
preclusion in a case with more limited discovery and an absence of live
testimony, but one in which the administrative proceedings more closely
followed district court discovery rules).
310. See Greg Reilly, Linking Patent Reform and Civil Litigation Reform,
47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 179, 213–14 (2015) (describing circumstances requiring
additional testimony or documentary evidence).
311. See B&B Hardware, 575 U.S. at 158–59 (noting that basic preclusion
principles allow such a showing on a case-by-case basis).
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The Federal Circuit’s Use of Mutant Preclusion to Justify
the Fresenius Rule

The Federal Circuit has pointed to issue preclusion to bar
litigation based on PTAB invalidation even when patent validity
was not at issue in the litigation. In Hologic, Inc. v. Minerva
Surgical, Inc.,312 the defendant was barred from asserting an
invalidity defense in litigation by assignor estoppel, “an
equitable doctrine that prevents a party who assigned a patent
to another from later challenging the validity of the assigned
patent in district court.”313 Even though invalidity was not a
proper issue in the litigation, the Federal Circuit held that
“Hologic is collaterally estopped from asserting infringement of
these claims” by an intervening (affirmed) PTAB invalidation.314
However, “decisions defining the scope of issue preclusion all
agree that it applies only when the same issue has been decided
in one case and arises in another.”315 Because invalidity did not
properly arise in Hologic due to assignor estoppel, issue
preclusion should have been irrelevant. The Federal Circuit
expressly rejected this straightforward application of preclusion
principles.316
Rather, the Federal Circuit seemed to apply a mutant form
of preclusion it labeled issue preclusion but that operated more
like claim preclusion. The Federal Circuit concluded that the
PTAB invalidation meant that “Hologic cannot assert those
[patent] claims or seek ongoing monetary or injunctive relief
based on infringement.”317 What was precluded was not the
specific issue of invalidity, as would be true under issue
preclusion, but the entire claim of patent infringement, as would
be true under claim preclusion.318 But claim preclusion is clearly

312. 957 F.3d 1256 (2020).
313. Id. at 1260–63, 1266.
314. Id. at 1267.
315. FPP, supra note 33, § 4417 (emphasis added).
316. See Hologic, 957 F.3d at 1264 (dismissing the plaintiff’s assertion that
collateral estoppel was inappropriate).
317. Id. at 1266.
318. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 17 cmt. (a)–(c) (AM. L.
INST. 1982) (explaining this distinction between claim and issue preclusion).

THE JUSTICIABILITY OF CANCELLED PATENTS

305

inapplicable in the context of PTAB invalidation, since
infringement cannot be raised in the PTAB.319
III. PATENT OFFICE CANCELLATION MOOTS PENDING
INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION AND DEPRIVES THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF JURISDICTION
Those who criticize the Federal Circuit for allowing PTAB
invalidation to trump pending litigation and prior judicial
decisions are correct that the Federal Circuit precedent rests on
shaky foundations, particularly by relying on issue preclusion.
However, the Federal Circuit’s Fresenius rule itself is largely
right. The Federal Circuit and its critics have largely overlooked
that the Fresenius rule, for the most part, reflects a
straight-forward application of the mootness doctrine, a
justiciability limit on the federal courts. This Part provides the
missing rationale for the Fresenius rule, explaining how Patent
Office cancellation moots pending litigation regardless of the
stage and how the mootness doctrine clarifies and corrects
aspects of the Federal Circuit’s approach. Mootness also justifies
vacating prior decisions in pending cases made before Patent
Office cancellation and addresses the criticisms levied against
allowing PTAB invalidation to trump pending litigation and
prior judicial decisions.
A.

Patent Office Cancellation Moots Infringement Litigation

For the most part, the Federal Circuit’s Fresenius rule
reflects basic principles of mootness. However, correctly
319. See FPP, supra note 33, § 4412 (explaining, as a limit on claim
preclusion, that “[i]t is clear enough that a litigant should not be penalized for
failing to seek unified disposition of matters that could not have been combined
in a single proceeding”). Claim preclusion also requires mutuality—that the
parties in the second action, or their privities, were all parties in the first
action. See YEAZELL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 143, at 720 (“[D]ifferent parties
possess different claims for preclusion purposes, even when those claims arise
out of the same transaction.”). The Federal Circuit, however, applies
preclusion based on PTAB invalidation even when the defendant in the district
court action was not the PTAB challenger. See XY, LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics,
L.C., 890 F.3d 1282, 1295 (2018) (“[T]he fact that the Defendant in this case
and the Petitioners in an inter partes review at the Board were different
parties is of no consequence.”).
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recognizing mootness as the basis for this rule also clarifies,
corrects, and limits the Federal Circuit’s approach.
1.

Mootness Extinguishes Pending Litigation upon Patent
Office Cancellation of the Asserted Patent Claims

Under the mootness doctrine, “federal courts are without
power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of
litigants in the case before them.”320 Mootness can occur either
because the issue itself is no longer “live” (issue mootness) or
because the parties have lost their own personal stake in the
issue (personal stake mootness).321 Relevant here, issue
mootness requires that “the legal issues that are sought to be
litigated must remain live or extant throughout the entire
course of the action.”322 A case is moot if an intervening event
causes the plaintiff to lose the right it seeks to vindicate.323 An
intervening event moots litigation when it “affects, resolves, or
terminates the subject matter of the controversy, and as a
result, the plaintiff has been divested of all interest, stake, or
claim in the subject of the dispute.”324 Specifically, “[w]hen
pending litigation involves a legal issue that is later disposed of
in another forum, the resolution of the issue or claim may render
the pending lawsuit moot, provided that the resolution of the
claim in the other forum is conclusive.”325 This includes
situations in which the issue is resolved by an administrative
agency.326
These principles explain why pending litigation is mooted
by completed PTAB proceedings invalidating the underlying
patent claims. The Patent Act explicitly makes the PTAB’s
administrative resolution of invalidity conclusive upon the
termination of all appeals (or expiration of the time for appeal)
320. North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971).
321. U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396 (1980); see Hall,
supra note 149, at 599–609 (highlighting that issue mootness is “constitutional
in nature” and personal stake mootness is “largely prudential”).
322. 15 MOORE’S, supra note 16, § 101.93[1].
323. Id. § 101.93[2].
324. Id. § 101.94[2].
325. Id. § 101.93[3].
326. Id.
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by requiring the Director of the Patent Office to issue a
certificate “canceling any claim of the patent finally determined
to be unpatentable[.]”327 The act of cancellation terminates the
invalidated patent rights.328 These patent rights granted by the
government, and these patent rights alone, are what gave the
patent owner exclusive rights in the invention and the ability to
prevent others from using it.329 The act of invention itself gives
the patent owner no enforceable rights to prevent others from
using the invention.330 Rather, it is only “the federal patent
scheme [that] creates a limited opportunity to obtain a property
right in an idea.”331 In the absence of enforceable patent rights
or when those rights cease to exist, the inventor has no right to
prevent the public from using the invention.332
Patent Office cancellation thus reflects the classic mootness
scenario where a plaintiff had a legally cognizable interest at
the time litigation began—viable patent rights giving it the
presumptive right to exclude others from using the invention—
but an intervening event (Patent Office cancellation) terminated
the subject of the controversy (the patent rights at issue in the
litigation and cancelled by the Patent Office), divesting the
plaintiff of its interest and claim in the litigation (the ability to
exclude the defendant from using the invention).333 The
327. 35 U.S.C. § 307(a) (ex parte reexamination); id. § 318(b) (inter partes
review); id. § 328(b) (post-grant review).
328. Id. §§ 307(a), 318(b), 328(b).
329. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (“The
grant of an exclusive right to an invention was the creation of society—at odds
with the inherent free nature of disclosed ideas—and was not to be freely
given.”).
330. See id. at 9 (“The patent monopoly was not designed to secure to the
inventor his natural right in his discoveries.”).
331. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 149
(1989).
332. See id. at 152 (“We have long held that after the expiration of a federal
patent, the subject matter of the patent passes to the free use of the public as
a matter of federal law.”); United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S.
178, 186–87 (1933) (“[U]pon the expiration of that [patent] period, the
knowledge of the invention enures to the people, who are thus enabled without
restriction to practice it and profit by its use.”).
333. See 15 MOORE’S, supra note 16, § 101.94[2] (“Although the plaintiff
may not have experienced any personal change in status, a lawsuit may
nevertheless be rendered moot if an intervening event affects, resolves, or
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situation is analogous to situations in which a case is mooted
because a party asserting an interest related to property lost
that property during litigation.334 Similarly, for a patent owner
asserting an infringement claim based on its exclusive right in
an invention, the case is mooted when the patent owner loses
that exclusive right.335 That the right is lost because of the
decision of another tribunal, and an administrative tribunal
specifically, does not alter the analysis. “[I]t is common to find
that a parallel proceeding is pending in another forum and that
resolution of the controversy in that forum will moot the issues
presented in the federal action,” including where “the parallel
forum is an administrative proceeding.”336
The conclusive nature of Patent Office cancellation
distinguishes PTAB invalidation from judicial invalidation for
justiciability purposes. The Patent Act makes invalidity a
defense in infringement litigation but does not provide for
cancellation of the patent claim upon a finding of invalidity in
the federal courts.337 Absent the filing of a disclaimer of the
invalidated claims in the Patent Office, the patent owner
technically retains a legally cognizable interest in exclusivity of
the invention338 and therefore an infringement action is not
moot. Rather, a subsequent defendant sued for infringement of
a judicially invalidated patent claim must assert an invalidity
defense and then rely on issue preclusion principles to preclude
re-litigation.339
terminates the subject matter of the controversy, and . . . divest[s] [the
plaintiff] of all interest, stake, or claim in the subject of the dispute.”).
334. Sidney A. Diamond, Federal Jurisdiction to Decide Moot Cases, 94 U.
PA. L. REV. 125, 133–34 (1946) (giving examples where cases “deal[ing] with
specific real or personal property” were mooted when “the property is sold or
otherwise disposed of”); Paramount Media Grp. v. Vill. of Bellwood, 929 F.3d
914, 919 (7th Cir. 2019) (dismissing a challenge to a municipality’s billboard
ban as moot because plaintiff’s lease to the property where the billboard would
be built was terminated).
335. See 15 MOORE’S, supra note 16, § 101.94[2].
336. Id. § 101.96.
337. See supra Part I.A.
338. See supra Part I.A.
339. See Blonder-Tongue Lab’ys, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313,
350 (1971) (directing that “one facing a charge of infringement of a patent that
has once been declared invalid” should be allowed a “plea of estoppel”).
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Mootness also justifies the Federal Circuit’s treatment of
the Fresenius rule as a mandatory bar on pending litigation and
demonstrates why critics are wrong to suggest that the effect of
Patent Office cancellation can be ignored by courts or at least be
subject to judicial discretion.340 Because mootness is a
jurisdictional limit, courts cannot decide moot issues.341 As a
jurisdictional matter, there is no general public interest,
manifest injustice, or discretionary exception to mootness.342
Rather, when an intervening event moots a case “the action can
no longer proceed and must be dismissed as moot.”343
This is not to say that mootness is without any flexibility or
discretionary components. Mootness is subject to three
“frequently-applied exceptions”: (1) when the claim is “capable
of repetition, yet evading review”; (2) when mootness is based on
“the defendant’s voluntary cessation of the challenged activity”;
and (3) when the named plaintiff’s claim is mooted in a class
action.344 Nothing about Patent Office cancellation implicates
these exceptions. Rather, these exceptions generally apply when
only the plaintiff’s personal stake in the issue is mooted (e.g., if
the plaintiff lost ownership of the patent), not when the issue
itself is mooted (as is true when the asserted patent claims are
cancelled).345 When the issue remains “live” but the plaintiff has
lost its personal stake in the issue, courts take a more
discretionary and flexible approach to mootness.346 By contrast,
“a finding that the issue is moot,” as is the case when the Patent
Office cancels the exclusive rights upon which litigation is

340. See supra Part II.C.
341. See North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971).
342. See 15 MOORE’S, supra note 16, § 101.90.
343. Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 72 (2013)
(emphasis added).
344. Hall, supra note 149, at 576 (internal quotations omitted).
345. Id. at 563.
346. See id. at 599 (emphasizing judicial discretion when “the issue raised
by plaintiff’s claim is not itself moot” but “the plaintiff’s personal stake in that
issue is moot”); id. at 608 (“[T]here are two doctrines of mootness—one largely
constitutional in nature, according to which a case raising only a moot issue
must be dismissed, and the other largely prudential, pursuant to which federal
courts may hear cases rendered moot by the expiration of plaintiff’s personal
stake.”).
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based, “means that the case no longer presents a case or
controversy and thus must be dismissed.”347
One aspect of mootness seems, at first, inconsistent with
the Federal Circuit’s approach allowing PTAB invalidation to
trump pending litigation and prior judicial decisions. Federal
Circuit precedent provides that PTAB invalidation wipes out the
entire infringement case, including claims for past damages for
pre-cancellation infringement.348 However, “[t]he availability of
damages or other monetary relief almost always avoids
mootness.”349 Under basic mootness doctrine, claims for past
damages for pre-cancellation infringement would seem to
escape mootness, and not just those already adjudicated by the
federal courts (the concern of many critics) but also those not yet
adjudicated or even filed at the time of Patent Office
cancellation. However, “[a] damages claim suffices to avoid
mootness only if viable.”350 Therefore, “it is appropriate to
dismiss the action as moot, without deciding the merits of the
claimed wrong, if damages are not legally available for that
wrong.”351 As discussed earlier, the Federal Circuit’s
long-standing interpretation, incorporated into the statute by
Congress’s acquiescence and reenactment (and extension) of the
relevant provisions, treats Patent Office cancellation as
extinguishing even past damages claims for pre-cancellation
infringement.352 Therefore, as a matter of patent law, past
damages are not legally available for pre-cancellation
infringement and do not, as a matter of general mootness
principles, suffice to prevent the mooting effect of Patent Office
cancellation.

347. Id. at 599 (emphasis added); see id. at 600 (“[C]ourts invariably
dismiss ‘issue moot’ cases.”).
348. See supra Part I.B.2.
349. FPP, supra note 33, § 3533.3.
350. Id. (emphasis added).
351. Id.
352. See supra Part I.B.2.
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Mootness Justifies the Federal Circuit’s Absolute Finality
Rule

Mootness doctrine also justifies what Gugliuzza calls the
Federal Circuit’s “absolute finality” rule. Under this rule, “a
PTO decision of invalidity that has been affirmed by the Federal
Circuit will justify vacatur of any court decision awarding
damages or imposing contempt sanctions, so long as the damage
award or underlying injunction has not merged into a final,
litigation-ending judgment.”353 But “[i]f a court decision
awarding damages for infringement is contained in a final,
litigation-ending judgment, that decision will be unaffected by
any subsequent PTO decision of invalidity.”354 This reflects basic
mootness principles, though the Federal Circuit has not looked
to mootness to justify its absolute finality rule.
The Supreme Court has “repeatedly held that an actual
controversy must exist not only at the time the complaint is
filed, but through all stages of the litigation.”355 For that reason,
“a court must not act in a case that has become moot, no matter
how late mootness arises” because “[d]eath of the case [during
litigation] ousts power to decide the merits.”356 Specifically, “[i]f
an intervening circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a personal
stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, at any point during
litigation, the action can no longer proceed and must be
dismissed as moot.”357 This is true regardless of whether the
intervening, mooting event occurs after the district court
judgment,358 while the case is pending on appeal,359 after

353. Gugliuzza, (In)valid, supra note 3, at 307.
354. Id.
355. Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 90–91 (2013) (internal
quotations omitted).
356. FPP, supra note 33, § 3533.10.
357. Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 72 (2013) (internal
quotations omitted).
358. See Barilla v. Ervin, 886 F.2d 1514, 1519 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[T]his court
may not decide the merits of a moot case, regardless of whether it was mooted
before or after the entry of judgment.”).
359. See FPP, supra note 33, § 3533.10 (“Many cases announce the basic
rule that a case must remain alive throughout the course of appellate
review.”).
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appellate oral argument,360 after the appellate opinion but
before the time to seek further review has expired,361 while a
writ of certiorari is pending in the Supreme Court,362 while the
case is being heard at the Supreme Court,363 or during
post-appellate proceedings in the district court.364
Mootness can arise at any point in litigation because
“[m]ootness goes to the very heart of Article III jurisdiction.”365
Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts to hearing a
“case” or “controversy,” and “[a] case that becomes moot at any
point during the proceedings is no longer a ‘Case’ or
‘Controversy’ for purposes of Article III, and is outside the
jurisdiction of the federal courts.”366 A federal court “cannot be
divested of its obligation to consider the issue of mootness on the
grounds that the timing or manner in which a party has raised
the issue is somehow procedurally improper.”367
A corollary of requiring litigation to be dismissed if mooted
at any stage is that a judgment is unaffected if the mooting
event occurs after the case is complete and terminated, since the
court had Article III jurisdiction throughout the case and does

360. See Donovan ex rel. Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336
F.3d 211, 215–17 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that the plaintiff’s “claim for
declaratory and injunctive relief is moot” despite appellate oral argument
having occurred).
361. See United States v. Ghandtchi (In re Ghandtchi), 705 F.2d 1315,
1316 (11th Cir. 1983) (appeal dismissed and district court judgment vacated
“where mootness occurred after an appellate court had issued a decision but
before the losing party could seek en banc reconsideration and before the
mandate had issued”).
362. See Alabama v. Davis, 446 U.S. 903, 903–04 (1980) (granting
certiorari solely to vacate lower court judgments when the case became moot
during certiorari proceedings).
363. See Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 97 (2009) (vacating lower court
judgment after discovering at oral argument that the case had become moot).
364. See FPP, supra note 33, § 3533.10 (“[T]he requirement that there be
a living dispute extends beyond appeal to post-judgment proceedings.”).
365. Smith v. United States (In re Smith), 921 F.2d 136, 138 (8th Cir.
1990).
366. United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1537 (2018)
(internal quotations omitted).
367. Barilla, 886 F.2d at 1519.
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not need it afterwards.368 The Federal Circuit’s absolute finality
rule is unexceptional when properly seen as an aspect of
mootness. The extensive criticism of it369 “overlook[s] the fact
that mootness is a jurisdictional defect,” and federal courts “may
not decide the merits of a moot case, regardless of whether it
was mooted before or after the entry of judgment.”370
3.

Mootness Clarifies, but also Limits, the Effect of Patent
Cancellation on Pending Litigation

Properly rooting the Fresenius rule in mootness resolves
confusion in the district courts and supports aspects of the
Federal Circuit doctrine that are problematic when viewed
through the lens of issue preclusion. But it also corrects, and
limits, the current Federal Circuit doctrine in two significant
ways.
Recognizing mootness as the basis for the Fresenius rule
resolves the debate in the district courts about the proper
disposition of infringement litigation extinguished by an
intervening Patent Office cancellation.371 Mootness is a
jurisdictional defect and therefore the case should be dismissed
without prejudice, rather than resolved on the merits by
summary judgment or dismissed with prejudice.372
Furthermore, the factors that make the Fresenius rule
inconsistent with issue preclusion—differing burdens of proof,
different procedures, the lack of exceptions, the fact that the
PTAB decision is second-in-time, and the application to cases
where invalidity is not at issue373—are irrelevant when properly
viewed through the lens of mootness. Mootness arises because
the Patent Office cancelled the exclusive patent rights at issue
368. Cf. Flying J Inc. v. City of New Haven, 549 F.3d 538, 544 (7th Cir.
2008) (noting that because the justiciability issue of ripeness is jurisdictional,
“[w]e are obliged to consider that at any point in the litigation” (emphasis
added)).
369. See supra Part II.C.
370. Barilla v. Ervin, 886 F.2d 1514, 1519 (9th Cir. 1989).
371. See supra Part I.B.3.
372. See Blue Water Balt. v. Pruitt, 293 F. Supp. 3d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2017)
(“[D]ismissals on the grounds of mootness constitute dismissals for want of
jurisdiction, which must be dismissed without prejudice . . . .”).
373. See supra Part I.D.1–2.
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in the litigation, not due to prudential concerns about the PTAB
and district courts deciding the same issue or reaching
inconsistent results.374 Cancellation eliminates the basis for suit
and moots the litigation, regardless of any differences between
the proceedings or issues involved.
Despite justifying and clarifying the Federal Circuit’s
Fresenius rule, properly recognizing the role of mootness
requires two significant changes in the Federal Circuit’s
doctrine. First, a mootness basis for the Fresenius rule alters the
event that extinguishes pending litigation. Under the issue
preclusion principles commonly cited by the Federal Circuit, the
PTAB’s invalidity decision itself should preclude federal court
litigation even before appeal.375 But the Federal Circuit has
ignored this and instead identified the precluding event as its
own affirmance of the PTAB’s invalidity decision.376 When
properly based on mootness, however, neither event moots the
infringement litigation. It is the cancellation of the patent
rights, which terminates the substantive basis for the
infringement case, that moots the litigation, not merely the
finding of invalidity.377 Neither the PTAB’s decision nor the
Federal Circuit’s affirmance cancels the invalidated patent
rights. Cancellation does not occur until the resolution of all
appeals and “the Director [has] issue[d] and publish[ed] a
certificate canceling any claim of the patent finally determined
to be unpatentable.”378

374. See supra Part III.A.1.
375. See supra Part III.A.2.
376. See Gugliuzza, (In)valid, supra note 3, at 305 (“Although the Federal
Circuit has not explicitly stated that rule, in Fresenius the court wrote that
‘the [reexamination] statute requires that a final PTO decision affirmed by this
court be given effect in pending infringement cases that are not yet final.’”
(emphasis omitted)).
377. See supra Part III.A.1; Ericsson Inc. v. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings,
Ltd., No. 2:15-cv-00011, 2018 WL 2149736, at *15 (E.D. Tex. May 10, 2018)
(dismissing infringement case as to claims found invalid by PTAB that were
not appealed and for which a cancellation certificate issued, but declining to
dismiss claims where PTAB invalidation was pending on appeal).
378. 35 U.S.C § 318(b) (inter partes review); see id. § 328(b) (using similar
language for post-grant review); see also id. § 307(a) (using similar language
for reexamination).

THE JUSTICIABILITY OF CANCELLED PATENTS

315

Cancellation thus must await not just Federal Circuit
affirmance but also potentially the time it takes (1) to seek and
resolve rehearing or rehearing en banc in the Federal Circuit;
(2) to file, and resolve, a petition for certiorari in the Supreme
Court; and (3) for the Director to prepare and issue the
cancellation certificate after everything else is complete. It does
not matter that none of these post-affirmance steps are likely to
change the outcome. “The ordinary conclusion is that a suit
remains justiciable despite a strong probability that a mooting
event will soon occur.”379 Thus, mootness delays the time at
which pending litigation must be dismissed as compared to
current doctrine, perhaps significantly. If mootness is properly
applied, more cases may reach absolute finality and avoid being
mooted, mitigating some of the concerns with the Federal
Circuit’s absolute finality rule. Of course, similar
gamesmanship to what already occurs may result, with the
patent owner using rehearing, certiorari, etc. to try to keep the
PTAB appeal pending long enough for the litigation to reach
complete finality and the accused infringer using whatever tools
it has to keep the litigation pending long enough for formal
cancellation to occur.
Second, a mootness basis limits the scope of the effect of
Patent Office cancellation on pending litigation more so than
does current doctrine. Several district courts have extended the
effect of PTAB cancellation to claims not at issue in the PTAB
that are not materially different from cancelled claims.380 Issue
preclusion would support this conclusion if the differences
between the cancelled and non-cancelled claims did not
substantially alter the invalidity issue.381 But mootness does not
depend on the similarity of the issues addressed by the PTAB
and federal courts but rather on whether or not the patent

379. FPP, supra note 33, § 3533.1.
380. See, e.g., Intell. Ventures I, LLC v. Lenovo Grp., 370 F. Supp. 3d 251,
256–58 (D. Mass. 2019) (summarizing Federal Circuit and district court
precedent to conclude that “for collateral estoppel to apply, the asserted
unadjudicated claim need not be identical to the adjudicated claim” if the
differences do not materially alter the invalidity question).
381. FPP, supra note 33, § 4417 (noting that issue preclusion is possible if
the differences in the underlying facts are not relevant under the governing
substantive rules).
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owner retains the right to exclude being asserted in litigation.382
Cancelled claims cease to exist, mooting litigation based on
those claims, but uncancelled claims remain in effect, even if
similar to cancelled claims.383 Federal courts thus retain
jurisdiction to hear infringement cases based on similar, but
uncancelled, patent claims. This more limited effect of Patent
Office cancellation also may mitigate some of the concerns
critics have with the Fresenius rule.
B.

The Consequences of the Mooting Effect of Patent
Cancellation

Mootness doctrine further justifies the Federal Circuit’s
practice of vacating prior infringement, invalidity, and/or
damages decisions in cases still pending at the time of Patent
Office cancellation.384 Courts “normally do vacate the lower
court judgment in a moot case.”385 This typically occurs when
the case becomes moot during appeal, but courts also vacate
prior decisions when a case is pending at other procedural stages
when mootness occurs, including in the district court before
appeal386 or on remand after some form of appellate review.387
382. See id. § 3533.3 (“[I]t is appropriate to dismiss the action as moot,
without deciding the merits of the claimed wrong, if damages are not legally
available for that wrong.”).
383. See supra note 377 and accompanying text.
384. See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1347
(2013).
385. Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 94 (2009); see City of Mesquite v.
Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 288 n.9 (1982) (“If it becomes apparent
that a case has become moot while an appeal is pending, the judgment below
normally is vacated with directions to dismiss the complaint.”). This also
applies when the case becomes moot in the Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme
Court. See, e.g., Columbian Rope Co. v. West, 142 F.3d 1313, 1317–18 (D.C.
Cir. 1998).
386. See FPP, supra note 33, § 3533.10 (describing the vacatur practice as
applying generally “when a case becomes moot after decision by the trial
court”).
387. See id. (noting that although the situation has not arisen frequently,
the vacatur rules “extend[] beyond appeal to post-judgment proceedings”); see
also id. § 3533.10.1 (suggesting a logical distinction between cases that become
moot pending the first appeal as of right and cases that become moot after an
opportunity for appellate review, but also indicating that such a distinction
has not yet been drawn in the precedent).
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Vacatur of prior decisions in moot cases is the
well-established practice, but there are exceptions.388 The
principal factor determining whether to follow the normal
practice of vacatur is the reason for mootness.389 Vacatur is
required when mootness results from happenstance not
attributable to the actions of any party or from the unilateral
actions of the prevailing party below.390 But when mootness is
the result of settlement or the unilateral action of the appellant,
courts can dismiss future proceedings while declining to vacate,
thereby leaving prior decisions and judgments intact.391 The
settlement exception clearly does not apply in the context of
Patent Office cancellation. Arguably, however, the exception for
the unilateral activity of the appellant could apply if the
infringement defendant is also the party who sought PTAB
review and therefore caused the proceedings that led to
cancellation.
Courts have declined to read the vacatur exceptions so
broadly as to cover this situation. The exception based on the
appellant’s actions is limited to truly “unilateral action,” such as
“voluntary cessation or compliance.”392 An infringement
defendant cannot unilaterally cancel a patent but rather
requires the impartial decision of an independent adjudicatory
body (the PTAB and perhaps the Federal Circuit) and the
actions of the Patent Office director in issuing the cancellation
certificate.393 Notably, the Patent Office can continue PTAB
proceedings and defend their outcome on appeal even if the
challenger drops out of the case.394 Patent Office cancellation
388. Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 712 (2011).
389. See 15 MOORE’S, supra note 16, § 101.97[2].
390. See U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 23,
25 n.3 (1994) (“[M]ootness by happenstance provides sufficient reason to
vacate.”); 15 MOORE’S, supra note 16, § 101.97[2] (same).
391. See U.S. Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 24–25 (declining to extend vacatur
requirement where mootness resulted from a settlement); 15 MOORE’S, supra
note 16, § 101.97[2] (noting courts’ rejection of vacatur when an appellant
“deliberately render[s] an action moot in the hope of avoiding the effect of an
unfavorable decision” or when a settlement leads “the party seeking review
[to] voluntarily forfeit[] the legal remedy sought”).
392. FPP, supra note 33, § 3533.10.1.
393. See supra note 374–379 and accompanying text.
394. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016).
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thus is not the result of the challenger’s unilateral action but
instead the result of an independent adjudication and
determinations made by entities wholly unconnected to the
challenger.
In these circumstances, vacatur remains the appropriate
remedy. According to a leading treatise, “[v]acating the
judgment is well warranted” when the mooting event results
from the “compulsion of some law other than the trial-court
judgment.”395 Specifically, “it has become the regular practice to
vacate the judgment with directions to dismiss” when the
mootness results from “rulings in other adjudicatory
proceedings.”396 This remains true even if one or both of the
parties to the moot litigation also are involved in the other
proceeding, such that their actions contributed to the mooting
decision in that case.397 For example, the Ninth Circuit explicitly
held that the decision in another case that moots litigation
qualifies as “happenstance,” making vacatur appropriate, even
though the appellant was a party in the other action, since the
appellant “could not be required to abandon their consistent
position in other pending litigation merely to avoid mooting out
another case.”398
Thus, mootness in the context of Patent Office cancellation
results from the “happenstance” of a decision in another case
(the PTAB proceeding). The Federal Circuit’s practice of
vacating prior decisions and judgments in pending cases upon
Patent Office cancellation of the asserted patent claims is
therefore consistent with the approach typically dictated by the
mootness doctrine. Admittedly, language in some cases suggests
a more discretionary, case-by-case approach to vacatur, a
question taken up in Part IV.A below.

395. FPP, supra note 33, § 3533.10.1.
396. Id. § 3533.10.
397. See id. (noting that vacatur is appropriate even when the mooting
event is “rulings by the same court in the same or companion proceedings”).
398. NASD Disp. Resol., Inc. v. Jud. Council of Cal., 488 F.3d 1065, 1070
(9th Cir. 2007).
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C. Mootness Addresses the Objections Raised to Allowing
Patent Office Cancellation to Trump Pending Litigation and
Prior Judicial Decisions
Recognizing that mootness mandates that Patent Office
cancellation trump pending litigation and prior judicial
decisions provides a sound justification for what otherwise
seems like an undesirable result—dismissing pending litigation
regardless of the stage and vacating prior judicial work upon
Patent Office cancellation. Mootness addresses each of the
doctrinal, separation of powers, and policy objections to the
Fresenius rule.399 Most obviously, mootness provides the sound
doctrinal basis critics have correctly noted is missing and
corrects the Federal Circuit’s clear error in relying on issue
preclusion.
Furthermore, critics have it backwards when they contend
that allowing Patent Office cancellation to trump pending
federal court litigation and prior judicial decisions raises
separation of power concerns. “It is a principle of first
importance that the federal courts are tribunals of limited
subject matter jurisdiction.”400 For the federal courts to hear a
case that is beyond the limited jurisdiction granted by the
Constitution is an unconstitutional aggrandizement of power,
not a mere technical violation.401 Mootness and the other
justiciability doctrines enforce Article III’s limit of federal court
jurisdiction to “Cases” and “Controversies.”402 These
justiciability limits serve, among other things, to “define the role
assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to
assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas
committed to the other branches of government.”403 Thus,
diligent adherence to mootness “is essential if federal courts are

399. See supra Part II.C.
400. FPP, supra note 33, § 3522.
401. See id.
402. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1968) (justiciability
generally); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (mootness
specifically).
403. Flast, 392 U.S. at 95; see U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S.
388, 396 (1980) (making the same point in a mootness case).
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to function within their constitutional sphere of authority.”404
Because federal courts lack the constitutional power to hear
moot cases,405 federal courts “cannot, consistently with the
limitations of Art. III of the Constitution, consider the
substantive . . . issues tendered by the parties” when mootness
is present.406
Thus, dismissing pending federal litigation and vacating
prior judicial judgments upon Patent Office cancellation does
not violate or denigrate Article III or separation of powers
principles. To the contrary, for the federal courts to continue to
adjudicate an infringement case based on patent rights that
have been terminated by the Patent Office would ignore the
Article III justiciability limits of the federal courts and cause
them to exceed their Constitutional sphere of power and
impinge on the power of Congress to create and design the
patent system and the power of the executive agency Congress
charged with granting and cancelling patent rights.
Moreover, the PTAB is not unconstitutionally reviewing,
overruling, or displacing a federal court judgment on patent
validity, as some critics contend.407 The PTAB and the federal
courts have concurrent jurisdiction to decide patent
invalidity.408 The PTAB does not review a prior decision of the
federal courts but instead undertakes a separate and unrelated
determination of the patent’s validity.409 The PTAB is answering
a different question than the federal courts—whether the patent
is invalid by a preponderance of evidence, rather than whether
the patent is invalid by clear and convincing evidence.410
Moreover, PTAB proceedings are limited to the record, grounds,
arguments, and evidence submitted in the PTAB proceeding,411
rather than reviewing the record and material from the federal
404. Rice, 404 U.S. at 246.
405. Id.
406. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1974).
407. See supra Part II.C.
408. See supra Part I.
409. See supra Parts I.B, III.C.
410. See supra Part II.D.1.
411. See, e.g., Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290, 1311 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (noting the requirement in the PTAB to “justify any finding of
unpatentability by reference to the evidence of record in the IPR”).
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court litigation. For that reason, PTAB invalidation can be (and
often is) based on different prior art references, combinations of
prior art references, and arguments than raised in the federal
court litigation.
When it uses the independent authority granted by
Congress to invalidate patent claims, the PTAB’s decision itself
does not overrule or in any way affect the federal court’s
decision.412 The federal court’s litigation is affected only because
Congress has provided for Patent Office cancellation once
appeals from the PTAB’s decision have been terminated.413 And
federal court litigation is affected not at the direction or
command of the PTAB or Patent Office but instead because of
Article III. An incidental effect of the Patent Office’s power to
cancel patent rights is the elimination of the substantive rights
necessary for the patent owner to have a justiciable case in
federal court.414 The Constitution, not the Patent Office, thus
usurps the power of the federal courts to proceed upon patent
cancellation. Nor is this unusual. Due to the federal courts’
limited jurisdiction and the concurrent jurisdiction frequently
possessed by other tribunals, “it is common to find that a
parallel proceeding is pending in another forum and that
resolution of the controversy in that forum will moot the issues
presented in the federal action,” and “[t]his is true regardless of
whether the parallel forum is an administrative proceeding.”415
In sum, ignoring the intervening cancellation of the patent
rights at issue in pending litigation would ignore the
constitutional structure and raise separation of powers
concerns, not the other way around.
For similar reasons, mootness addresses the policy concerns
critics of the Fresenius rule raise regarding inefficiency,
gamesmanship, and undermining patent incentives.416 It is
worth noting initially that others have raised countervailing
policy considerations in favor of allowing Patent Office
cancellation to trump pending litigation and prior judicial
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.

See supra Part III.A.3.
See supra Parts I.B.2, III.A.3.
See supra Part III.A.1.
15 MOORE’S, supra note 16, § 101.96.
See supra Part II.C.
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decisions. Federal Circuit Judge Dyk has noted the unfairness
of forcing a party to pay damages for infringement of a patent
that has conclusively been found invalid and wrongfully issued,
especially when others in the industry are no longer subject to
the patent’s exclusive rights.417 The Supreme Court too, in a
slightly different context, has identified the negative economic
consequences of enforcing a patent’s restraint on competition
when the patent is invalid and therefore does not reflect a
contribution to society.418 This debate need not be resolved,
however, because considerations other than efficiency and
patent policy are at play. Because mootness is a jurisdictional
limit on the federal courts, the policy considerations of
individual cases and individual subject matters, such as patent
law, must yield to the more general concerns of constitutional
structure and separation of powers (explained above) that
mootness is meant to protect.
Indeed, the concerns raised about inefficiency and wasted
resources when Patent Office cancellation trumps pending
litigation and prior judicial decisions are common for federal
jurisdictional issues, which can always be raised at any stage of
litigation.419 For example, the hallmark federal jurisdiction case
of Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley420 was litigated
to judgment on the merits in the lower courts and proceeded
through Supreme Court briefing and argument without
challenge to federal jurisdiction.421 But the Supreme Court
raised the issue itself for the first time in its opinion and
dismissed the case for lack of federal jurisdiction.422 The case
had to be refiled in state court, litigated on the merits a second
417. See ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 790 F.3d 1307, 1309 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (Dyk, J., concurring); see also Gugliuzza, (In)valid, supra note 3, at
276 (“[I]t seems wrong to allow a patent holder to collect damages for the
infringement of a now-invalidated patent.”).
418. See Blonder-Tongue Lab’ys, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313,
342–47 (1971) (criticizing the idea of forcing an alleged patent infringer to pay
royalties until the patent’s validity can be litigated).
419. See FPP, supra note 33, § 3522.
420. 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
421. See id. at 152.
422. See id. at 152, 154 (“Neither party has questioned that jurisdiction,
but it is the duty of this court to see to it that the jurisdiction of the circuit
court, which is defined and limited by statute, is not exceeded.”).
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time, and resolved a second time by the Supreme Court, this
time on the merits.423 Nor is gamesmanship and a so-called
“second bite at the apple” unique to the Fresenius rule. For
example, for over two centuries, the federal courts have held
that a plaintiff can file in (or a defendant can remove to) federal
court and invoke federal jurisdiction, lose on the merits,
belatedly raise a jurisdictional objection to the federal court they
selected, succeed, and refile in state court with the hope of
obtaining a more favorable outcome on the merits.424
Concerns
about
inefficiency,
wasted
resources,
gamesmanship, and bad substantive policy, no matter how
legitimate, must yield to the fundamental concerns of
constitutional structure and separation of powers embodied in
the jurisdictional limits of federal courts. A leading federal
courts treatise explains that “[t]his harsh rule would be
indefensible if what was involved was a simple question of
procedural regulation of practice. It can be justified only because
the issue concerns the fundamental constitutional question of
the allocation” of power within the constitutional structure.425
With that said, the next Part addresses ways to mitigate these
policy concerns while still respecting the jurisdictional limits of
the federal courts.
IV. IMPROVING COORDINATION OF DUPLICATIVE INVALIDITY
PROCEEDINGS WITHIN THE JUSTICIABILITY LIMITS OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS
The rule that Patent Office cancellation extinguishes
pending litigation and requires vacating prior judicial decisions
raises reasonable concerns about inefficiency, gamesmanship,
and the unfairness of giving the defendant multiple chances to
invalidate the patent. Due to the applicability of the mootness
doctrine, a justiciability limit on the federal courts, the Patent
423. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467 (1911).
424. See Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126 (1804) (reversing
a judgment for the defendant after the plaintiff appealed for lack of federal
jurisdiction); FPP, supra note 33, § 3522 (explaining that the Court reached a
similar result to Capron “concerning a defendant who removed a case from
state court and later lost at trial in federal court”).
425. FPP, supra note 33, § 3522.
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Office cancellation cannot simply be ignored or made a matter
of judicial discretion to avoid these policy concerns, as some
suggest.426 Yet the courts and Congress both have potential tools
to mitigate the policy concerns that arise.
Some of these tools are too extreme to be feasible. Congress
could abolish PTAB proceedings and return to the exclusive
federal court jurisdiction over invalidity existing before the
1980s.427 Or Congress could abolish invalidity as a defense in
infringement litigation, giving the Patent Office exclusive
authority to decide patent invalidity.428 Widespread concerns
about patent quality and the resulting tendency to expand
Patent Office post-issuance proceedings over the past forty
years suggest the former is unlikely.429 And the long-standing
historical practice dating to the earliest days of the patent
system suggest the latter is unlikely.430 More reasonably,
Congress or the courts could make stays of litigation mandatory
or at least strongly presumptive, as many commentators have
proposed.431 More frequent litigation stays would help. But stays
will not always be feasible or desirable.432
Thus, the problems that arise when Patent Office
cancellation occurs belatedly in litigation are, to some extent,
inevitable433 and seem to arise quite regularly, judging by the

426. See supra Parts II.C, III.C.
427. See supra Part I.A.
428. See Gugliuzza, (In)valid, supra note 3, at 326 (noting a similar
possibility).
429. See Picozzi, supra note 3, at 2520–21 (“The Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act expanded, rather than limited, reexamination, and subsequent
legislative proposals have favored patent challengers. Consequently, courts
remain the actors best positioned to address the problems caused by parallel
proceedings.”).
430. See Gugliuzza, (In)valid, supra note 3, at 327 (“Shifting validity
proceedings entirely to the PTO, however, would be a drastic change, as courts
have had the power to issue validity rulings since Congress passed the very
first Patent Act in 1790.”).
431. See supra Part II.C.
432. See supra Part I.C.1.
433. See Gugliuzza, (In)valid, supra note 3, at 321, 323–25 (outlining the
conflicts that will occur “as long as both the courts and the PTO possess
independent power to invalidate a single patent”).

THE JUSTICIABILITY OF CANCELLED PATENTS

325

number of cases raising this issue over the past decade.434 If
Patent Office cancellation late in litigation cannot be fully
avoided, this Part offers ways that courts and Congress can
mitigate the policy concerns that arise while staying faithful to
mootness principles and the Article III justiciability limits of the
federal courts.
A.

The Courts May Have Discretionary Power to Decline to
Vacate Prior Decisions in Belatedly Moot Cases

As previously explained, general mootness principles justify
the Federal Circuit’s practice of vacating prior decisions and
judgments when pending litigation is mooted by the
happenstance of Patent Office cancellation.435 But even if the
Federal Circuit’s practice of vacating prior decisions is justified
by mootness principles, is it required? Critics’ most significant
concern with the Federal Circuit’s approach to Patent Office
cancellation is the vacating of prior decisions on infringement,
invalidity, and damages, particularly those that have been
conclusively resolved at the appellate level.436 If mootness
principles did not require the Federal Circuit to vacate such
decisions—even if they justify it in doing so—the policy concerns
raised by critics may be mitigated while adhering to the
justiciability limits of Article III.
Some language in the precedent suggests that the federal
courts have significant discretion regarding vacatur. The
Supreme Court has indicated that vacatur is “rooted in equity”
and therefore depends on “the conditions and circumstances of
the particular case.”437 It has also noted that courts must “take
account of the public interest” in deciding on vacatur because
they must “dispose[] of moot cases in the manner most
consonant to justice.”438 The Court has gone so far as to state
that “[i]t is [the losing party’s] burden, as the party seeking
434. See supra Part II.B–C.
435. See supra Part III.B.
436. See supra Part II.C.
437. Azar v. Garza, 138 S. Ct. 1790, 1792 (2018) (internal quotations
omitted).
438. U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 24, 26
(1994) (internal quotations omitted).
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relief from the status quo of the [prior] judgment, to
demonstrate . . . equitable entitlement to the extraordinary
remedy of vacatur.”439 This would seem to give courts discretion
on a case-by-case basis to decide whether or not to vacate prior
judgments on infringement, invalidity, and damages when
Patent Office cancellation moots the litigation.440 Courts could
conclude based on public policy concerns of efficiency,
gamesmanship, and preventing multiple shots at invalidity that
allowing the prior judgment to stand is most consistent with
justice.
Even so, this would only be a limited exception to the
Fresenius rule. Courts have no discretion to undertake further
proceedings in moot cases, so the most a court could do is leave
the case exactly where it was at the time of Patent Office
cancellation.441 If any issue related to infringement, validity, or
past damages still needed to be decided at that time, the
plaintiff would lack an enforceable judgment and the practical
effect would be equivalent to vacating the prior decisions.442
Moreover, the precedent is clear that vacatur is necessary when
mootness occurs before the opportunity for any appellate review
(absent voluntary forfeiture of further review by the
appellant).443 Otherwise, a defendant who would normally be
entitled to review of an adverse decision in an infringement case
would bizarrely be deprived of that review simply because
another tribunal (the PTAB) concluded that the patent rights at
issue were wrongfully issued. “A party who seeks review of the
merits of an adverse ruling, but is frustrated by the vagaries of
439. Id. at 26.
440. See 15 MOORE’S, supra note 16, § 101.97[2] (“Whether to vacate must
be determined on a case-by-case basis, governed by the facts and equitable
factors rather than by inflexible rules.”).
441. See North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (finding that
“federal courts are without power to decide questions that cannot affect the
rights of litigants in the case before them”).
442. See 15 MOORE’S, supra note 16, § 101.97 (explaining the effect of
vacatur).
443. See Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 712 n.10 (2011) (noting that
vacatur has been denied when it “did not deprive the appealing party of any
review to which he was entitled” but that vacatur was appropriate to
“expunge[] an adverse decision that would be reviewable had this case not
become moot”).
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circumstance, ought not in fairness be forced to acquiesce in the
judgment.”444
Thus, the court’s discretion to decline to vacate prior
decisions would only mitigate concerns about the Fresenius rule
in the most extreme situations where infringement, invalidity,
and past damages have been conclusively resolved, including on
appeal, and the case is only pending at the time of mootness on
matters of prospective relief (e.g., injunction or running
royalties) or ministerial matters (e.g., attorney’s fees).445 The
precedential support for vacatur in such circumstances, where
the relevant decision was already subject to appellate review
and affirmance at the time of mootness, is weakest.446 Moreover,
one of the primary policy reasons for vacatur is missing—that a
decision should not be allowed to stand where mootness
deprived the losing party of the chance for appellate review.447
However, it is not clear that the precedent actually supports
general discretion to decide vacatur based on case-by-case public
policy considerations.448 The Supreme Court’s decision in U.S.
Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership,449 which is
the strongest articulation of equitable discretion, emphasizes
that “[t]he principal condition to which we have looked is
whether the party seeking relief from the judgment below
caused the mootness by voluntary action,”450 a situation not
present in the context of Patent Office cancellation.451
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have indicated that the
discretion to deny vacatur on policy considerations is limited to
situations where the losing party voluntarily forfeits its right to
444. U.S. Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 25.
445. See, e.g., Chrimar Systems, Inc. v. ALE USA Inc., 785 F. App’x 854,
854 (2019) (case pending only on on-going royalties, and maybe also a
counterclaim of non-infringement, at time of mooting).
446. See supra Part III.B.
447. See Camreta, 563 U.S. at 712 n.10 (“We have therefore left lower court
decisions intact when mootness did not deprive the appealing party of any
review to which he was entitled.”).
448. See FPP, supra note 33, § 3533.10.1 (stating that the rule of vacatur
yields to “some measure of discretion” only “when mootness results from a
party’s action”).
449. 513 U.S. 18 (1994).
450. Id. at 24.
451. See supra Part III.B.
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further review by settlement or other voluntary surrender of a
legal remedy.452 In the absence of such a voluntary forfeiture,
the Supreme Court has indicated that the “ordinary practice” of
vacatur should be followed.453 It has even suggested that it is the
court’s duty to vacate prior decisions when, as here, mootness
occurs by happenstance, not settlement or voluntary
forfeiture.454 Moreover, even if appellate review has occurred,
one of the policy reasons for vacatur still applies—preventing
any preclusive effect from mooted cases and preserving the
rights of all involved.455
Notably, despite the language indicating general equitable
discretion, lower courts have interpreted the Supreme Court
precedent as creating a limited exception to the ordinary
practice of vacatur only where the losing party voluntarily
forfeits further review.456 They have concluded that the
Supreme Court’s recognition of equitable and public interest
considerations in U.S. Bancorp did not “undo the established
precedential backdrop . . . that vacatur is the duty of the
appellate court when a case has become moot through
happenstance while appeal was pending.”457 Regardless of
452. See Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 94 (2009) (stating that “we
normally do vacate the lower court judgment in a moot case” and “describ[ing]
circumstances where we would not do so” as settlement and voluntary
forfeiture).
453. See id. at 97.
454. See United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 39–40 (1950)
(delineating appellate courts’ duty to reverse or vacate when a case becomes
moot pending appellate review); see also U.S. Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 25 n.3
(reaffirming Munsingwear as to mootness by happenstance and describing it
as holding that happenstance “provide[d] sufficient reason to vacate”); FPP,
supra note 33, § 3533.10 (describing “[t]he rule that requires vacation and
dismissal on request” unless “mootness results from settlement or the actions
of one party”).
455. See Alvarez, 558 U.S. at 94 (discussing the tendency to vacate the
lower court judgment to allow for future relitigation and preservation of the
parties’ rights).
456. See, e.g., NASD Disp. Resol., Inc. v. Jud. Council of Cal., 488 F.3d
1065, 1068–70 (9th Cir. 2007) (characterizing a refusal to vacate as the
exception to the general rule and limited to situations involving the parties’
own actions, not happenstance like when the case is “mooted by court decisions
in other cases”).
457. Columbian Rope Co. v. West, 142 F.3d 1313, 1318 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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broader language in some Supreme Court cases, “[v]acatur is
generally appropriate as long as mootness was not caused by
any fault or unilateral action of the party seeking to appeal.”458
Thus, adopting a case-by-case approach on vacatur when
infringement litigation is mooted by Patent Office cancellation
would depart from the general judicial practice and represent
an unwarranted patent exceptional approach to a general
procedural issue.459
B. Congress Could Restrict the Retroactive Effect of Patent
Office Cancellation to Limit Its Effect on Pending Litigation
Aside from eliminating concurrent invalidity jurisdiction or
mandating stays, Congress has one clear way to mitigate the
concerns that arise when Patent Office cancellation belatedly
moots pending infringement litigation—limiting the retroactive
effect of Patent Office cancellation to exempt some or all claims
for pre-cancellation infringement. As previously explained,
because mootness generally does not extend to viable past
damages claims, the only reason Patent Office cancellation
moots claims for pre-cancellation infringement is because, as a
matter of patent law, cancellation is applied retroactively to
render the claims “void ab initio,” making past damages claims
for pre-cancellation infringement legally unavailable.460 Since
Congress has endorsed this conclusion, it has become a
statutory requirement that only Congress can alter.461
Congress has broad power to define patent rights and to
design the patent system,462 including defining the effect of
PTAB proceedings on invalidated patent rights.463 Congress’s
control over reissuance provides a useful historical analog.
458. 15 MOORE’S, supra note 16, § 101.97[2].
459. See Gugliuzza, Federal Circuit, supra note 42, at 1817–18 (discussing
the Supreme Court’s distaste for patent law exceptionalism).
460. See supra Parts I.B.2, III.A.
461. See supra Part I.B.2.
462. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966)
(realizing Congress’s power to “select[] the policy which in its judgment best
effectuates the constitutional aim” of the patent power).
463. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142–46 (2016)
(indicating that the design of PTAB proceedings is a question for Congress and
the Patent Office).
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Originally, when a patent was reissued, the original patent was
treated as surrendered and extinguished, so courts concluded
that reissuance extinguished past damages claims for
pre-reissue infringement.464 Congress subsequently amended
the relevant statutory provisions in 1928 to exempt some past
damages claims for pre-reissue infringement from the
retroactive effect of reissuance, specifically those based on a
patent claim that was substantially identical in the original and
reissued patent.465
Similarly, Congress is not limited to the current options
where either the patent right is confirmed in PTAB proceedings
or the patent right is void ab initio, wiping out all past damages
claims. Rather, Congress could make cancellation fully
prospective, exempting all past damages claims for
pre-cancellation infringement, even those not yet filed. Congress
could exempt only past damages claims for pre-cancellation
infringement filed at the time of cancellation. Or only those
resolved by a district court final judgment. Or only those
resolved by a district court final judgment where liability (or just
validity) has been affirmed on appeal. Any past damages claims
exempted by Congress could continue to be litigated in the
district courts and on appeal even after Patent Office
cancellation, since viable past damages claims are not mooted.
Whether Congress should limit the retroactive effect of
Patent Office cancellation is a more difficult question. Doing so
could mitigate concerns about inefficiency, gamesmanship, and
patent policy problems when Patent Office cancellation
belatedly moots litigation. It would also encourage the earlier
assertion of claims for infringement by patent owners trying to
get litigation to the point of exemption before any Patent Office
cancellation, and the earlier filing of PTAB invalidity challenges
by competitors and accused infringers trying to obtain Patent
Office cancellation before the litigation reaches the point of
exemption. The former gives notice of potential infringement
earlier in a product’s lifecycle when alterations or abandonment

464. See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1337–38
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (recalling that under the pre-1928 statute, the reissue
eliminated causes of action under the original patent).
465. See id.
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may be more viable and before significant monetary exposure
has accrued. The latter terminates invalid patents earlier,
removing the restriction on competition for the public at large.
Finally, allowing patent owners to recover some damages for
infringement even when their patent is cancelled could protect
the reliance interests patent owners incurred from the Patent
Office’s original issuance of the patent.466
However, patent invalidity has always been applied
retroactively, first as a litigation defense to past damages claims
and subsequently as an assumed part of Patent Office
post-issuance proceedings since their creation in the 1980s.467
Even the exemption Congress created in the reissuance context
only applied to claims that were unaffected by the reissue
proceedings and remained substantively identical to the original
claims.468 Moreover, patent rights are free market exceptions
that restrict competition and follow-on innovation and, as such,
are only justified to the extent they reward, and therefore
incentivize, inventors for a legitimate inventive contribution.469
Because invalidation indicates the absence of a legitimate
contribution, “[a] patent yielding returns for a device that fails
to meet the congressionally imposed criteria of patentability is
anomalous.”470 Limiting the retroactive effect of Patent Office
cancellation also could be inequitable, as it would leave some
competitors and some acts (i.e., those before cancellation)
subject to the exclusive rights of the patent but not others (i.e.,
those after cancellation). This inequitable treatment
advantages some competitors at the expense of others for no
legitimate reason, with negative economic consequences for both
the affected firms and consumers.471
466. See Greg Reilly, The PTAB’s Problem, 27 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 31,
41–46 (2019) (addressing patent owner reliance concerns from PTAB
invalidation).
467. See supra Part I.B.2.
468. See Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1337–38 (discussing the 1928 amendment
and the exception to the rule allowing for claims “substantially identical with
the original patent”).
469. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313,
343 (1971).
470. Id.
471. See id. at 346 (noting that competitors subject to patent restrictions
will suffer decreased profitability, competitors not subject to patent
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The historical anomaly and policy concerns of limiting the
retroactive effect of Patent Office cancellation warrant caution.
At the very least, Congress should adopt only a narrow
exemption to address the most significant problems with the
Fresenius rule—for example, exempting only claims where
liability has been conclusively resolved even on appeal at the
time of cancellation. More broadly, the policy concerns with
restricting competition in the absence of a legitimate
contribution and treating different competitors inequitably
seem to cancel out policy concerns with the Fresenius rule about
causing inefficiency, gamesmanship, and repetitive challenges.
That policy considerations point in both directions suggests that
Congress should defer to the wisdom embodied in the
long-standing practice within the patent system of making
invalidity fully retroactive.472
Although limiting the retroactive effect of patent
cancellation is the best way within the justiciability limits of the
federal courts to address concerns about the Fresenius rule, the
novelty of this approach and countervailing policy
considerations advise against doing so without further work
that establishes whether, and to what extent, prospective-only
patent invalidation is normatively desirable. In the interim,
Congress should adhere to the existing practice of retroactive
patent invalidation, even if it has negative consequences for the
subset of cases where Patent Office litigation belatedly moots
infringement litigation.
CONCLUSION
Ordinary mootness principles require the dismissal of
infringement litigation that is pending at any stage in federal
court when the asserted claims are cancelled by the Patent
Office as the result of a PTAB invalidation decision. The Federal

restrictions will expand market share, and consumers will pay higher prices
than if patent invalidity had broader effect).
472. See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429–30
(1908) (acknowledging that Congress consistently “continued [a] policy
through many years” may allow us to “assume that experience has
demonstrated its wisdom and beneficial effect upon the arts and sciences”).
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Circuit has largely reached this correct outcome.473 But its
failure to offer a persuasive rationale has fueled doctrinal,
policy, and separation of powers objections to allowing Patent
Office cancellation to trump pending litigation and prior judicial
decisions. Mootness provides the missing rationale. Patent
Office cancellation extinguishes the substantive patent rights
on which the infringement suit is based, depriving the federal
courts of jurisdiction under Article III justiciability principles.
Because mootness is jurisdictional, the federal courts cannot
simply ignore or exercise discretion regarding the effect of
Patent Office cancellation out of concern for efficiency,
gamesmanship, or patent policy, as some have proposed. Rather,
they must dismiss the pending litigation and typically should
vacate any prior decisions on the merits.474
Courts and Congress may have tools to mitigate the
problems that arise when the Patent Office cancellation comes
late in litigation while still honoring the justiciability limits on
federal courts. Courts could exercise their equitable discretion
to dismiss the case but decline to vacate prior judgments.
However, this would only affect the most extreme circumstances
where liability and past damages are fully resolved, including
on appeal, at the time of cancellation and would involve an
unadvisable patent exceptional approach to a general
procedural issue. Congress could exempt litigation where the
invalidity issue has reached some level of finality (e.g., on appeal
or even at the district court) from the retroactive effect of Patent
Office cancellation, but this would be a major departure from
historical practice and raise concerns about the negative policy
consequences of requiring some, but not all, competitors to pay
a patent owner who did not make a legitimate contribution to
the progress of society.

473. See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1340 (Fed.
Cir. 2013).
474. See Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 712–13 (2011) (noting the
established practice of vacating the judgment below when a suit becomes moot
pending appeal).

